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ABSTRACT
This study examines the impact on women of funding social programs through the tax system. It
does so using the framework of tax expenditure analysis, which allows one to view any
departure from the normative tax system (i.e., those basic rules, such as the tax rate and the tax
unit, that comprise the revenue-raising part of the system) as a spending measure. The analysis
also takes into account the socio-economic realities of women’s lives and concludes that many
tax measures that are subsidies in respect of social programs do not benefit women to the same
extent that they benefit men. Tax measures explored include the child care expense deduction,
the Canada Child Tax Benefit, tax subsidies for retirement saving, the disability tax credit and
tax relief for caregivers. The conclusion is that in many instances women have less access to
these tax subsidies and, often, the amount they receive is less than the amount that men receive.
The study concludes with a list of issues that should be considered by those involved in the tax
policy process in order to ensure that women are not disadvantaged in comparison to men when
tax subsidies are used to fund social programs.
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PREFACE
Good public policy depends on good policy research. In recognition of this, Status of
Women Canada instituted the Policy Research Fund in 1996. It supports independent
policy research on issues linked to the public policy agenda and in need of gender-based
analysis. Our objective is to enhance public debate on gender equality issues, and to enable
individuals, organizations, policy makers and policy analysts to participate more effectively
in the development of policy.
The focus of the research may be on long-term, emerging policy issues or short-term,
urgent policy issues that require an analysis of their gender implications. Funding is
awarded through an open, competitive call for proposals. A non-governmental, external
committee plays a key role in identifying policy research priorities, selecting research
proposals for funding and evaluating the final reports.
This policy research paper was proposed and developed under a call for proposals in
August 1998 on Women and the Canadian Tax System. Research was invited that would
examine the tax system, its underlying assumptions about women’s lives and whether it
has a different impact on women and men. Status of Women Canada funded two research
projects on this issue: one project providing a broad analysis and one that looks
particularly at the impact on women as mothers and workers.
A complete list of the research projects funded under this call for proposals is included at
the end of this report.
We thank all the researchers for their contribution to the public policy debate.
FOREWORD
As always, a project of this nature is not a one-person production. I owe thanks to several
people, including my two excellent research assistants. Melinda Anderson did a
magnificent job assembling many of the statistics used in this report and Beth Long
provided outstanding research and editorial assistance. I also wish to thank Susan Boyd
who has patiently read so much of my work and enriched it with perceptive insights.
Thanks are also due to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
which helped to fund some of the research used in this report by way of a grant provided
through the Major Collaborative Research Initiative Program. This report was, however,
primarily funded by the Policy Research Fund of Status of Women Canada. I wish to
express my sincere appreciation to that organization and, in particular, the Director of
Research, Zeynep Karman, for having the foresight to recognize how important it is to
evaluate the impact of the tax system on women and for their assistance in bringing this
project to fruition.
Some of the material is this report is based on my earlier work, including “Child Care—A
Taxing Issue?” in the McGill Law Journal (1994), “(In)visible Inequalities: Women, Tax
and Poverty” in the Ottawa Law Review (1994) and “Taxing Times for Women: Feminism
Confronts Tax Policy” in Tax Conversations (1997).
This report was completed on October 26, 1999 and the law is that which was in force on
that date, although there is reference to changes proposed in the 1999 federal budget.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since its inception in 1917, the Canadian income tax system has evolved into much more than
a revenue-raising instrument. Over the years, it has become a most powerful social and
economic tool, one that is increasingly implicated in the delivery of social programs. Just as
the role of the tax system has shifted, so have some of the social and economic realities of
women’s lives. For example, more women than ever are working in the paid labour force,
more women are living alone and fewer women are in relationships with men. Yet some
things remain the same. Women’s work in the home remains undervalued and is not
considered productive work, women remain the primary caregivers for children, and a
disproportionate number of single women live below the poverty line. To date, the issue of
the impact on women of using the tax system to deliver social programs has not been
analyzed in any detail. There is virtually no research in Canada that evaluates the
effectiveness and fairness of using the tax system to subsidize social programs. The
government publishes tax expenditure accounts that quantify the cost of each tax measure
that is considered to be a spending measure rather than part of the normative tax system. A
normative tax system comprises those rules that are viewed as part of the basic revenue-
raising components of the tax system, such as the tax rate and tax unit. Other measures that
depart from that normative base, such as tax deductions, credits and exemptions, are in fact
spending measures. However, one major problem is that the tax expenditure accounts do not
include any gender breakdown.
The focus of this study is consideration of the impact on women (as compared to men) of
delivering social programs through the tax system. The study situates the analysis in the
social and economic realities of women’s lives, and recognizes that women are not a
monolithic group. Their experience is affected by differences among them which are the
consequence of social conditions such as race, age, sexual orientation, class and disability.
While recognizing the value of the traditional tools of tax policy analysis in evaluating tax
measures, this study uses equality among particular groups in society as the foundation of its
analysis. An equality analysis is applied to those tax measures used to deliver social
programs. The intention is to determine how those measures apply to women. Do women
benefit to the same extent as men? How does women’s socio-economic status affect their
access and entitlement to tax subsidies? The tax measures that are the focus of this study are
the tax subsidies related to children, dependence, retirement saving, and those for individuals
with disabilities and their caregivers.
This study outlines the application of the tax rules and reviews the impact of those rules on
women. Suggestions for changes that might reduce or eliminate the negative impact of a
particular rule on women are put forward to stimulate discussion and possible reform. In
some instances, the only solution to the problem is to remove the subsidy from the tax system
and deliver it in another manner. In other instances, specific amendments to the income tax
rules would improve the situation.
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The child care expense deduction and the Canada Child Tax Benefit are discussed in detail.
Given that women are the primary caregivers for children, these subsidies are very important
for women. The conclusion is that both these subsidies have problems. For example, the child
care expense deduction is inadequate in amount and is worth more in terms of tax dollars
saved to those with higher incomes than to those with lower incomes. The limitations with
respect to the definition of income to which the deduction can be applied have a negative
effect on many women. The Canada Child Tax Benefit is targeted in a manner that
disadvantages those women on social assistance in comparison to the working poor.
Suggested options for reform to the child care expense deduction include increasing the
amount of the deduction, removing restrictions on the nature of the income to which the
deduction may be applied or converting the deduction to a refundable tax credit (as is done in
Quebec). The key issue for consideration with respect to the Canada Child Tax Benefit is
whether the tax system is the appropriate tool for delivering this program.
The tax system plays a significant role in subsidizing retirement saving; yet, for a variety of
reasons, women do not have as much access to these subsidies as men. One reason is that the
tax subsidies are provided for contributions to, and the income earned by, private pension
plans, such as occupational pension plans and registered retirement savings plans (RRSPs).
For a variety of reasons, many women are unable to contribute to these plans; if they do
contribute, they often receive less of a tax subsidy than men. A primary reason for women’s
unequal access to tax subsidies for occupational pension plans is that access to these plans
depends on participation in the paid labour force in jobs that provide these plans. For
example, 70 percent of part-time workers are women, but these plans are not usually
available to part-time workers. Tax breaks for occupational pension plans and RRSPs are
also of no value to women who work only in the home, or who have no discretionary funds
to contribute to an RRSP. Given that the role of universal pension schemes such as the Old
Age Security (OAS) appears to be diminishing and that the government is encouraging more
reliance on private pension plans, it is important to remedy women’s lack of access to tax
subsidies for retirement savings. One suggestion is to remove all tax preferences from the
Income Tax Act and redirect the funds to the more “universal” plans such as the Old Age
Security and the Canada Pension Plan (CPP). Alternatively, current tax rules could be
reformulated to allocate the subsidy in a manner that ensures women are not disadvantaged in
comparison to men, either in respect of their access to the subsidy or the amount they
receive.
Tax subsidies related to dependence, such as the spousal tax credit, need to be rethought.
These measures are a disincentive to women’s participation in the paid labour force and
undermine women’s autonomy. The caregiver tax credit, which is intended to recognize
women’s caregiving in the home, also acts as a disincentive to women’s participation in the
paid labour force and should be restructured to remove this disincentive. The study discusses
whether the tax system is the appropriate tool for delivering subsidies related to dependency
and offers options for reform of the current rules. Suggestions include, for example, the
removal of the spousal tax credit and the conversion of the tax deductions in respect of
caregiving to refundable tax credits.
vii
The study concludes with recommendations intended to assist those who prepare
amendments to the Income Tax Act, including officials at the Department of Finance and the
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, to evaluate the gender impact of any proposed
changes and to consider, in a more informed manner, the impact of those changes on women.
The recommendations are also intended to provide women’s groups and others interested in
the issue of the impact of the tax system on women with information that might assist them in
the preparation of submissions to the government on tax policy issues. In addition to a call
for the use of statistical data on the socio-economic realties of women’s lives in the setting of
tax policy, Appendix A to this study includes a list of 10 questions that should be considered
whenever changes to the income tax system are contemplated. The intention is that the
questions will allow policy makers and others to determine if a particular measure might have
a negative impact on women. If it does, how might that negative impact be avoided?
INTRODUCTION
During the first fifty years of income taxation in Canada, there is no evidence
that anyone paid any attention to the effects of these and other policies on
women. Women were still largely disenfranchised, and certainly had virtually
no access to political and bureaucratic processes. Nor did they have access to
the legal, accounting, and taxation professions in any kinds of numbers or in
any kinds of positions that would have made any kind of systematic inquiry
possible (Lahey 1988: 378).
While consideration of the impact of tax policies on women has been the subject of some study
in the 30 years that have elapsed since the period referred to in the quotation above, there is
much more work to be done.1 Since its inception in 1917,2 the Canadian income tax system has
evolved into much more than a revenue-raising instrument. Over the years, it has become a
most powerful social and economic tool, one that is increasingly implicated in the delivery of
social programs. Just as the role of the tax system has shifted, so have some of the social and
economic realities of women’s lives. For example, more women than ever are working in the
paid labour force, more women are living alone and fewer women are in relationships with
men. Yet some things remain the same. Women’s work in the home remains undervalued and
is not considered productive work, women remain the primary caregivers for children and a
disproportionate number of single women live below the poverty line.
To date, the issue of the impact on women of using the tax system to deliver social programs
has not been analyzed in any detail. There is virtually no research in Canada that evaluates the
effectiveness and fairness of using the tax system to subsidize social programs.3 The
government publishes tax expenditure accounts that quantify the cost of each tax measure
that is considered to be a departure from the normative tax system and, therefore, a spending
measure.4 However, these accounts do not include any gender breakdown. Tax expenditure
accounts are limited in the knowledge they provide because they take a quantitative rather
than a qualitative approach. That is, they do not examine the impact on differently situated
individuals or groups of using tax expenditures to fund social programs.5 This problem led
the National Association of Women and the Law to recommend in 1991 that the “federal
government should collect and disseminate data on the impact of the tax system, according to
gender” (NAWL 1991b: 4, emphasis added).
The focus of this study is the impact on women (as compared to men) of delivering social
programs through the tax system. The study situates the analysis in the social and economic
realities of women’s lives, and recognizes that women are not a monolithic group. Their
experience is affected by differences among them, which are the consequence of social
conditions such as race, age, sexual orientation, class and disability. While recognizing the
value of using the traditional tools of tax policy analysis in evaluating tax measures, this study
uses equality among particular groups in society as the foundation for analysis. An equality
analysis is applied to those tax measures that are used to deliver social programs. The result
is a discussion of the differential impact on women compared to men of tax expenditures used
2to subsidize social programs. Rather than making specific policy recommendations, the study
raises options for reform that suggest different ways in which the inequalities might be
redressed. The intention is to encourage debate among those who make tax policy, women’s
groups and other interested parties about the most appropriate manner in which to proceed.
The study also includes recommendations for tax policy makers and others that are intended
to allow policy makers to consider directly the impact of proposed tax measures on women.
These recommendations will help ensure that any gender disparity that may arise as a result
of the impact of a particular tax provision is reduced and, if possible, eliminated.
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the issues that are at the core of this study. It provides
an overview of the income tax rules and reviews the purposes underlying the Canadian
income tax system. It considers how we evaluate tax measures by reference to criteria such as
equity, neutrality and simplicity, and discusses, in detail, the relevance of an analysis that
focusses on equality. The concept of tax expenditures is discussed. A key point of this
chapter is to draw attention to the need to examine issues respecting the impact of certain tax
measures on women in a manner that considers the socio-economic realities of women’s lives
and the differences among women.
Chapter 2 examines tax subsidies related to children. These subsidies have a direct impact on
women who tend to be the primary caregivers of children. The operation of the child care
expense deduction and Canada Child Tax Benefit is discussed in detail, and the problems with
these expenditures are reviewed.
Chapter 3 discusses tax subsidies for retirement saving. Tax breaks for contributions to, and
income earned by, registered pension plans (occupational pension plans) and registered
retirement savings plans are discussed. The chapter considers the relationship between this
method of funding retirement saving and the poverty experienced by so many women in
retirement.
Chapter 4 discusses other tax subsidies that have a differential impact on women compared to
men. They include tax subsidies related to dependence, such as the spousal tax credit and the
ability to transfer certain unused tax credits to a spouse. Tax subsidies for those with
disabilities and those who care for family members are also discussed.
Appendix A consists of specific recommendations intended to assist those who make tax
policy and women’s groups in ensuring that any proposed tax measures do not have a more
negative impact on women than men.
It is important to state, at the outset, the limitations of a study of this nature. First, the focus
is the federal income tax system, not provincial tax systems, although because Quebec
administers its own income tax system, some of the Quebec rules are discussed where they
vary from the federal rules. Second, this study is limited to an analysis of those income tax
rules that provide subsidies for social programs. The study is not a review of the impact of
the tax system generally on women. Therefore, issues such as what the appropriate unit of tax
should be and the non-taxation of imputed income6 are not discussed in any detail. Finally,
3not all measures that relate to the funding of social programs are included. The study
focusses only on those measures that disadvantage women compared to men.
Endnotes
1
 There have been several research reports in the last decade or so that have focussed on
women and tax. See, for example, CACSW (1987); Lahey (1988); NAWL (1991); and
Ontario Fair Tax Commission (1992).
2
 Income War Tax Act, S.C. 1917, c. 28.
3
 A significant body of Canadian literature examines the use of tax expenditures but this
literature does not take gender into account. See, for example, Bruce (1988); Domingue
(1988);  Doern (1989: 75-105); Maslove (1991); Lindquist (1994: 32-128); and Perry
(1995).
4
  The concept of tax expenditure analysis and which tax measures can be considered to be
expenditures is discussed in detail in Chapter 1.
5
 The most recent tax expenditure account is Canada 1999.
6
 Imputed income is earned income in kind. In this context, the argument is that the value of
women’s unpaid labour in the home is imputed income, and that ignoring its value for tax
purposes is problematic. Unless the tax system recognizes the value of household production
by either taxing it or giving tax relief to women who work outside the home in the paid
labour force, those women who work outside the home are at a disadvantage compared to
women who work exclusively in the home in an unpaid capacity. In effect, women who work
outside the home have to purchase household services or forego leisure time in order to
provide for themselves and their families. There has been some debate within the feminist
literature on how to compensate for the non-taxation of these amounts. See for example,
Staudt (1996).
1: AN INTRODUCTION TO TAX POLICY ANALYSIS
Overview of the Tax System
There is much to be done to rid the income tax system of its overtly
discriminatory provisions, as well as its systemic bias against women (Maloney
1987: 44).
Income taxes are levied both by the federal government, and by the provincial and territorial
governments. Income tax is payable on an individual’s worldwide income. The Income Tax
Act1 taxes on the basis of the source of that income with the result that different rules may
apply in the computation of that income, depending on the source of the income. The main
sources of income are employment income, business income, property income, other income
and capital gains. The Act requires taxpayers to compute their net income by including
certain amounts from each source in income and taking any allowable deductions. Taxable
income is net income less any other deductions such as losses carried over from previous
years. Federal tax payable is a percentage of taxable income. At present, there are three
federal rates of tax (17 percent on the first $29,590 of income, 26 percent on the amount of
income in excess of $29,590 up to $59,180 and 29 percent on the amount in excess of
$59,180). Once federal tax payable has been calculated, the taxpayer may apply any non-
refundable federal tax credits available. These will reduce the amount of tax payable.
Examples of these tax credits include the personal tax credit, the marital (spousal) tax credit,
the dependant tax credit, the charitable donations tax credit and the political donations tax
credit. The next step is to calculate the federal surtax, which is three percent of basic tax
payable up to a maximum of $250. Finally, tax is reduced by any refundable tax credits
available and if taxable income is reduced to zero the credit can result in a refund to the
taxpayer, even though no tax was payable. Examples of refundable tax credits include the
Goods and Services Tax (GST) credit and the Canada Child Tax Benefit.
The federal government and all provinces except Quebec have entered into agreements
whereby the federal government collects income taxes for the provinces.2 Quebec imposes
and collects its own income taxes, applying a system that is similar to the federal system in
structure, although it is fully independent of the federal system. The provinces that have
entered into tax collection agreements with the federal government levy an income tax that is
a percentage of federal tax payable. The amount of the provincial income tax varies from
province to province. For the 1998 taxation year, the rates ranged between a high of 69
percent in Newfoundland (plus a surtax of 10 percent on provincial tax in excess of $10,000)
to a low of 42.75 percent in Ontario. The agreements also permit the provinces to provide
certain tax credits to taxpayers that are provincial in nature.
In Quebec, there are three rates of tax: 20 percent on the first $25,000 of income, 23 percent on
income in excess of $25,000 up to $50,000 and 26 percent on the amount in excess of $50,000.
While the structure of the Quebec tax system is similar to that of the federal system, there are
5differences in the specific provisions. This study discusses those Quebec tax rules that are
designed to subsidize social programs and that differ from the federal rules.
Purposes of a Tax System
[T]axation depends on choices made collectively about what goods and
services should be provided through government, what proportion of the
income of society should be redistributed among its members, how the
revenue needed to provide those goods and services should be raised, and
how the tax system should be used to influence the decisions of individuals
(Ontario Fair Tax Commission 1993: 32).
An income tax system is a multi-faceted government program. Arguably, it is the
government’s most important policy instrument because its impact is so far reaching,
affecting all Canadians on a daily basis in so many different ways. Obviously, one of its
primary objectives is to raise revenue to be spent on government programs, but that is only
part of its role. Increasingly, our tax system is being used to achieve other goals, although
which goals take precedence over others varies from time to time as the political climate
changes.3 Some of the other functions of a tax system include redistributing economic
resources when the private market fails in this regard, redistributing income to reduce the
inequalities between rich and poor, imposing additional costs in order to fulfil a regulatory
function and stabilizing the economy. Different tools are used to achieve different goals.
Therefore, for example, progressive marginal tax rates are intended to ensure that there is a
more equal distribution of disposable income than there would be if all taxpayers paid tax at
the same rate regardless of their income. The function that is most pertinent to this study is
the tax expenditure function of the tax system. Tax expenditures are used for a variety of
purposes, including to redistribute income, to encourage certain economic behaviour and, in
the context of this study, the highly important function of delivering subsidies for social
programs. This tax expenditure function is discussed in detail later in this chapter.
Fairness of a Tax System
The achievement of a fair tax system in a democracy is rightly regarded as a
matter of high economic and social importance (Head 1993: 4).
Traditional tax policy analysis has judged the effect of tax measures and, to a certain degree,
their fairness by reference to three particular factors—horizontal and vertical equity,
neutrality and simplicity. Underpinning these criteria are the normative values of income
taxation based on ability to pay which recognizes that some are more able to contribute than
others, and the use of taxation as a tool for income redistribution. The hallmark of taxation
based on ability to pay is the progressivity of the tax system. A progressive system is one that
imposes graduated rates of tax with the result that those with higher incomes pay tax at a
higher rate on that higher amount of income.
6Horizontal equity is defined as the requirement that equals be treated equally. In other words,
all persons in the same circumstances should be treated in the same manner. Therefore, for
example, one can argue that two people with the same amount of income should pay the
same tax. But horizontal equity is an increasingly difficult concept to pin down. The key issue
when deciding whether this criterion is being adhered to is determining which individuals are
“similarly situated.” For example, as Neil Brooks (1993: 181-184) has pointed out, the long-
standing tax policy view that two individuals with the same amount of income should pay the
same amount of tax is being challenged in the name of lower taxes for the rich. The argument
is that such a point of comparison means that the return on individuals’ savings is included in
income and that is unfair to the person with thriftier habits. Thus, the call is being made for
the point of comparison not to be the amount of income each individual earns but rather the
value of their consumption. This kind of analysis undermines the basic tenet of taxation based
on ability to pay.
Vertical equity requires that persons in differing situations be treated in an appropriately
different manner. Again, this criterion is closely connected to the principle of taxation based
on ability to pay. One can argue that adherence to the principle of vertical equity has been
eroded over time, especially since the 1987 “tax reform” process. At that time, the number of
tax rates was reduced from 10 to three and the top federal rate from 34 percent to 29
percent. Even though we have seen an increase in top tax rates because of surtaxes, the
system is not as progressive as it was prior to the 1987 reform.4 In addition, the introduction
of the GST—a flat rate consumption tax—has meant a further decrease in the progressivity
of the tax system.5 Furthermore, there are frequent calls from many quarters, including
several provincial governments, for a general lowering of tax rates. Such a move could
further detract from the progressivity of the system, thus further eroding the vertical equity of
the tax system.
The criterion of neutrality requires that the tax system does not distort taxpayers’ social and
economic choices. For example, the decision whether or not to work in the paid labour force
or the decision to spend money rather than save should not be influenced by the workings of
the tax system. Underlying this concept of neutrality is the concern that distortion of
economic choices may result in a misallocation of resources because taxpayers may choose to
direct money into activities that receive preferential tax treatment, rather than those that do
not. But it is not only economic choices that should not be distorted by the tax system. Social
choices, such as the choice to marry or to live in a common-law relationship or to remain
single, should not be made as a consequence of any preferential tax treatment that would
ensue from choosing one lifestyle over another.
While the phrase “a simple tax system” may appear to be an oxymoron, it is clear that most
people would support the idea that a tax system should be as simple as possible. It is
important that taxpayers understand the impact of the tax rules on them and their activities. It
is also important that the taxing authorities are able to administer the system, something that
becomes more difficult as the system becomes more complex. Thus, simplicity is another
criteria by which we judge the effectiveness of the tax system.
7While the principles discussed above are an important foundation of our tax system, some
authors have commented recently on how traditional tax policy analysis has, in the past,
omitted a very important element—equality among particular groups in society.6 Maureen
Maloney (1994: 118), for example, has pointed out that “[w]hile current interpretations of
equity, both vertical and horizontal, may catch class biases, they do not go far enough
because the need for equity is generally recognized with respect only to the distribution of
income.” Evaluation of the tax system by reference to equality is not as limited in scope as
some of the approaches discussed above. It requires an examination of the impact of the rules
on particular groups in society to determine if they are treated in a prejudicial manner. In this
study, the group examined is women, although, as I discuss later in this chapter, they are
women with differing social identities.
Any analysis of the equal application of income tax rules must take into account that equality
does not merely mean formal equality. Rather, the analysis must also encompass the concept
of substantive equality. An approach based on formal equality would treat all individuals the
same regardless of the differences between them. It has been said that this approach “is
inadequate to the task of creating real equality because it does not encompass or even
acknowledge inequality of condition. Substantive equality recognizes that in order to achieve
equality, different groups in society may require different treatment” (Brodsky and Day 1989:
150). It has been put this way by the Supreme Court of Canada:
In fact, the interests of true equality may well require differentiation in
treatment. In simple terms, then, it may be said that a law which treats all
identically and which provides equality of treatment between “A” and “B”
might well cause inequality for “C”, depending on the differences in personal
characteristics and situations. To approach the ideal of full equality before and
under the law—and in human affairs an approach is all that can be expected—
the main consideration must be the impact of the law on the individual or
group concerned [emphasis added].7
An example of formal equality in the tax context is the gender neutrality of tax legislation.
Each provision applies to both men and women and yet, as I discuss, women suffer
significant substantive inequalities when compared to men in terms of the impact of the
system on them.
There is no doubt that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,8 particularly section
15(1),9 has had a profound effect on our conception of what equality is and how it might be
achieved. The consideration of what is “equal protection and equal benefit of the law” has
been the subject of much debate and reflection both in the courts and elsewhere. In the tax
context, there have been two section 15 challenges based on sex discrimination that have
been heard by the Supreme Court of Canada in recent years. In Symes v. Canada10 a
practising lawyer argued that her child care expenses should be deductible as a business
expense and in Thibaudeau v. Canada (M.N.R.)11 a woman receiving child support from her
ex-spouse argued that the requirement that child support payments be included in income
discriminated against her on the basis of her sex. Both women lost their cases, but the
8Charter, its application to women and the concept of equality all came under very close
scrutiny. In determining whether or not there was inequality in the application of the Charter,
L’Heureux-Dubé J. (in dissent) took an approach that I endorse in this study. In determining
that to deny the deduction of child care expenses as a business expense was sexist, she
considered the impact of the rule on Symes. Furthermore, she did so in a manner that took a
contextual approach and considered the socio-economic realities of women’s lives. She said:
[I]t is clear that this area of law is premised on the traditional view of business
as a male enterprise and that the concept of a business expense has itself been
constructed on the needs of businessmen. This is neither a surprising nor a
sinister realization, as the evidence well illustrates that it has only been in fairly
recent years that women have increasingly moved into the world of business
as into other fields, such as law and medicine. The definition of “business
expense” was shaped to reflect the experience of businessmen, and the ways in
which they engaged in business.… As a consequence, the male standard now
frames the backdrop of assumptions against which expenses are determined to
be, or not to be, legitimate business expenses. Against this backdrop, it is
hardly surprising that child care was seen as irrelevant to the end of gaining or
producing income from business but rather as a personal non-deductible
expense.12
To date, federal and provincial tax policy analysis has not done an especially good job of
considering the impact of the tax rules on women as a group. Canada is not alone in this
regard. No member country of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) has undertaken the task of reviewing the impact of its tax system on women in any
systematic manner. Canada has, however, taken the lead in some respects by including
classification by sex, as well as age, marital status, geographic location and income level in the
Taxation Statistics (now renamed the Income Statistics). A further important step is the
publication of the tax expenditure accounts that list the amount of all expenditures made
through the tax system. These accounts do not, however, include any gender breakdown, a
serious omission.
Tax Expenditure Analysis
The use of the tax system as a method of enhancing people’s standard of
living is as old as the federal system of income tax itself. In sharp contrast to
transfers through conventional social security or social welfare programs,
whose cost and administration are part of the regular public monitoring,
comment, and study, the benefits provided through the tax system have been
hidden from public scrutiny (Guest 1997: 189).
The concept of tax expenditure analysis is key to this study. It is the theoretical framework
that, together with the concept of equality, allows us to determine whether or not the tax rules
discussed in this report operate in a fair manner in terms of their application to women.
9In 1973, Stanley Surrey wrote the classic text in which he developed the tax expenditure
concept. His thesis was that any measures, such as income exclusions, deductions, deferrals or
tax credits, which depart from a normative tax system13 are tax expenditures.14 That is, rather
than funding a particular activity or program by way of a direct grant, the subsidy is delivered
through the tax system. The concept has captured the imagination of many, including the
federal government that incorporates tax expenditure analysis in the budget process and
publishes annual accounts that list the cost of every tax expenditure. The insights provided by
this theoretical framework include a recognition that because the tax measures are part of a
spending program, their effectiveness should be measured by criteria other than the traditional
tax policy evaluative methods discussed above, such as equity, neutrality, economic efficiency
and simplicity. Budgetary criteria, such as whether the measure is target efficient, should play a
greater role in our evaluation of tax expenditures. I would submit that equality is also a key
issue for consideration in the evaluation of a particular measure. Given that the allocation of a
significant amount of money is at stake, it is important to identify who benefits from the
expenditure and, of course, who does not.
The tax expenditure concept is based on an analysis that views the tax system as consisting of
two components. There are the technical tax rules designed to raise revenue, which form the
basis of the tax system (the benchmark or normative tax system), and the rules that deviate from
that benchmark and which are expenditures. Therefore, deductions in the computation of
income, exemptions from tax, deferral of tax and tax credits are tax expenditures to the extent
that they depart from the benchmark. Perhaps the most controversial issue concerning tax
expenditure analysis is the identification of those elements that constitute the benchmark and
those elements that depart from it. Much has been written on this issue,15 but at the end of the
day, provided the criteria used to determine which measures are tax expenditures are clearly
articulated, tax expenditure analysis is a valid analytical tool. The Government of Canada
considers the benchmark individual tax system to consist of the tax rates and income brackets,
the tax unit (the individual), the taxation period (the calendar year) and the fact that no account
is taken of inflation (Dept. of Finance 1998: 35-38). Any measure that departs from this
benchmark is a tax expenditure. For the purposes of this study, tax expenditures are considered
to be those listed in the latest tax expenditure accounts issued by the Government of Canada
(Dept. of Finance 1998: 35-38).
The value of each tax expenditure is calculated by reference to the revenue foregone by the
government by reason of the particular measure. It is important to remember that when one
compares the cost of tax expenditures to the cost of a direct grant, a dollar of a tax expenditure
is often worth more than a dollar of a direct grant to the recipient. This situation arises when
amounts received as direct grants are required to be included in income for tax purposes. For
example, a tax expenditure comprising a $100 deduction in the computation of income would
be worth $40 to an individual paying tax at a combined federal–provincial rate of 40 percent.
Meanwhile, a direct grant of $40 would translate to only $24 of after-tax income, once the tax
owing computed at a rate of 40 percent ($16) was paid.
Canada has been a leader in publishing tax expenditure accounts detailing the cost of each such
expenditure. The first tax expenditure account was released in 1979 and, since 1992, these
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accounts have been published on an annual basis.16 Several provinces, including British
Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario and Alberta, have published tax expenditure
accounts from time to time (Lindquist 1994: 79-87). While Quebec has not issued a tax
expenditure account, it did release a discussion paper in 1993 that listed several tax incentives
designed to encourage economic growth and estimated the cost of those incentives (Quebec
1993).
Tax expenditure analysis has also become part of the federal government’s budgetary
process. In the late 1970s the federal government introduced the Policy and Expenditure
Management System (PEMS). It was designed to ensure that more control was exerted
with respect to tax expenditures. The idea was that tax expenditures would no longer be
“free” money for departments to allocate. If a department was successful in convincing the
Department of Finance that a particular tax expenditure should be made, then the cost of
that expenditure through lost tax dollars was deducted from the total amount allocated to
the department for all expenditures. There were also efforts made to diminish the power of
the Department of Finance with respect to tax expenditures and to ensure that the Priorities
and Planning Committee of the federal government played a greater role. It has been said,
however, that “not only did PEMS never work according to plan, but only a shadow
remains of the original system” (Lindquist 1994: 78). Furthermore, the Department of
Finance remains the key player in the administration of current tax expenditures and the
evolution of new ones.17 Given the hugely important role of the Department of Finance as
the department responsible for the formation of tax policy and the drafting of amendments
to the Income Tax Act, Chapter 5 of this study includes guidelines intended to assist the
Department in determining what the impact of any amendments to the Act that relate to the
funding of social programs might be on women.
It is often said that business supports the use of tax expenditures while social policy activists
do not favour the use of tax expenditures.18 Some of the concerns that social activist groups
have raised about the proliferation of tax expenditures include the hidden nature of tax
expenditures, the fact that tax expenditures are often not well targeted and perhaps, most
important, the favouring of high-income earners when subsidies are delivered through the tax
system. The latter problem arises when tax expenditures are delivered as deductions in the
computation of income. Deductions are worth more in terms of tax dollars saved to those
who pay tax at a high rate than those who pay tax at a lower rate. For example, a $1,000
deduction in the computation of income is worth $500 to a high-income individual who pays
tax at a federal–provincial combined rate of 50 percent, but it is only worth $200 to the
individual with less income who pays tax at a rate of 20 percent. And, of course, a tax
expenditure that is a deduction in the computation of income is of no value to an individual
who pays no tax.19 This state of affairs produces what is referred to as an “upside-down
effect” whereby those who need the subsidy most by reason of their low incomes either
receive no subsidy at all or receive less than those with higher incomes. This situation has led
many social activists to argue that tax expenditures should be converted into direct subsidy
programs (Ontario Fair Tax Commission 1993: 1034). Alternatively, if the use of the tax
system to deliver social programs is to be retained, then the tax deduction should be replaced
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by the tax credit, the amount of which is worth the same to all taxpayers regardless of their
income level.
Recently, the position of social activists with respect to tax expenditures has become a little
more ambivalent on the issue of whether tax expenditures have a role to play in subsidizing
social programs. As one commentator has noted (Doern 1989: 91), social groups
would like some of the favourable privacy and flexibility aspects that accrue
when one delivers social programs through the tax system. Many social
programs were demeaning because of the imposition of means tests. Social
policy recipients dislike bureaucratic grant based interventions as much as do
business persons. The logic of these developments was that many social
groups saw the tax system as a less demeaning vehicle for social policies,
especially if they were delivered as refundable tax credits.
What are the benefits of tax expenditure analysis? Put simply, drawing on the concept that
many tax measures are spending measures, the debate becomes one that focusses on spending
and not taxing. When the focus is spending, the evaluative criteria that we apply are very
different from those applied when we view the tax system as only being about raising revenue
and the redistribution of income. As Neil Brooks has stated: “To argue that a spending
program should be repealed because it violates the tax criteria of horizontal equity or
neutrality is simply a non sequitor [sic]. Its purpose could not be achieved without violating
these norms.”20
One of the first advantages of tax expenditure analysis is that we can quantify the amount
spent on a particular program through the tax system. As previously mentioned, the
Government of Canada now publishes an account of the amount of all tax expenditures on an
annual basis and the figures used in this study are, unless otherwise stated, taken from the
latest tax expenditure account which was issued in 1999. A second insight drawn from tax
expenditure analysis is that an important question to be answered when one is evaluating a
tax expenditure is whether the expenditure is target efficient. Does the tax measure
accomplish its intended goals? Another issue is whether a particular tax measure is cost
effective, or is there a cheaper way to deliver the program, such as by way of a direct grant?
Perhaps the most important question to pose in the context of this study is whether subsidies
delivered by way of a tax expenditure are allocated in a fair manner. That is, are there
individuals who do not have access to the subsidy who should have that access? Are there
individuals who receive less of that subsidy than others for no good reason? If the answers to
those two questions are affirmative, that does not necessarily mean there is no role for the tax
system and that a direct grant should be used in place of the tax expenditure. Rather, it may
just mean that the tax measure should be redesigned to remedy the unequal access.
The issue of whether the tax system is an inappropriate tool for delivering a subsidy in the
first place has been debated over the years. Neil Brooks (1986: 692) discusses the early
position of Stanley Surrey who first applied the term “tax expenditure” to spending programs
delivered through the tax system. Originally, Surrey was clearly in favour of removing tax
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expenditures from the tax system entirely and delivering the subsidies directly. But, Surrey’s
position moderated as time went on, and he eventually reframed the issue as one of how
government subsidy programs should be designed (Brooks 1986). In this study, many of the
options for reform are based on retaining a tax expenditure while redesigning it to redress its
unequal impact. There are several reasons that the study does not advocate removal of all tax
expenditures. One is the increased visibility of tax expenditures in recent years with the
publication of tax expenditure accounts. This increased visibility leads to more accountability
by government for spending measures delivered through the tax system. Another important
consideration is that, given political reality and the current budget process, it seems unlikely
that tax expenditures that have an unequal impact on some individuals would be removed
from the tax system. An easier course of action for a government that is committed to
funding social programs through the tax system is to amend the particular provision in a
manner designed to remedy its unequal application. Only if it appears that the strictures of the
tax system prevent redressing the problem by way of amendment to the tax measure should
the program be removed from the tax system and delivered in another manner, such as by
way of a direct grant.
In conclusion, tax expenditure analysis is a valuable tool for evaluating those tax measures that
are spending programs. Its use in the government’s budget process is to be welcomed, and the
publication of tax expenditure accounts is a vital measure that allows us to consider some of
the implications of delivering subsidies through the tax system. In this study, I endeavour to
consider the implications for women of delivering social programs through the tax system and,
in so doing, add an element that is missing from the debate about tax expenditures—an analysis
of the difference gender makes and how women are disadvantaged in comparison to men.
The Socio-Economic Context in which Women Live Their Lives
Women are not poor for the same reasons that men are poor; and women, as a
group, experience economic inequality with all its ramifications. The lack of
success in eliminating these conditions is directly attributable to an
unwillingness on the part of policy makers to acknowledge that poverty and
economic inequality have a gendered character that is further complicated by
racism, and discrimination based on disability (Day and Brodsky 1998: 8).
Any analysis of the impact on women of delivering social programs through the tax system
cannot be done in a vacuum. The socio-economic realities of women’s lives must be part of
the discussion because those realities directly affect both women’s access to tax subsidies and
the share of those tax subsidies that they receive. When the tax system was introduced in
1917, very few women worked outside the home. Many more women were married, and
women depended more on others such as fathers and husbands for their financial well-being.
Over the years, some things changed. But, as I demonstrate in this study, the tax rules have
not kept pace with those changes. Some of the important socio-economic realities that must
be borne in mind include the following.
• Women tend to earn less than men and they tend to be less wealthy than men.21
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• Women of colour, Aboriginal women and women with disabilities earn less than their
male counterparts and less than other women (Statistics Canada 1995: 138, 153, 166).
 
• More women than ever before are participating in the paid labour force, although many of
these women are employed on a part-time basis.22
• Women with disabilities are less likely to enter the paid labour force than men with
disabilities or non-disabled persons (Fawcett 1996: 24, 159-160).
• Women’s work in the home remains undervalued and is not considered to be
“productive” work. This factor also contributes to the undervaluation of caring work
performed predominantly by women outside the home, such as child care. Women remain
the primary caregivers for children.
 
• The number of lone-parent families in Canada is on the increase with women
predominantly heading these families.23
 
• Aboriginal women and women of colour are more likely to be lone parents than White
women.24
 
• Single mothers with children are disproportionately represented among the poor.25
 
• More women than ever before are living alone, and fewer women are living in
relationships with men (Statistics Canada 1997a: 2, 6).
All these social and economic factors must be considered when analyzing the impact of
funding social programs through the tax system because they are, as I discuss, directly
implicated in determining whether or not women receive these subsidies and, if they do
receive them, the amount that they receive. As I demonstrate, in many cases the social and
economic realities of women’s lives impede women’s access to tax subsides in comparison to
the access enjoyed by men and also result in differential access for differently situated
women.
There are several other important issues that must be taken into account when considering
the context in which women live their lives. In 1995, the government repealed the Canada
Assistance Plan (CAP), a cost sharing program with the provincial governments, and replaced
it with the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST).26 The CHST is a block-funding
program whereby the federal government transfers funds to the provinces for use in the areas
of health, post-secondary education and welfare. The consequence of this measure is a
devolution of financial responsibility to the provinces with a corresponding diminution of the
role of the federal government as a monitor and protector of the Canadian social safety net.
As Shelagh Day and Gwen Brodsky (1998: 11) state in their analysis of the impact of this
restructuring of Canada’s social programs:
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There can be no doubt that the repeal of the CAP, combined with the shift to
the CHST, represents an extremely serious threat to the social security system
in Canada. In one fell swoop the federal government has eliminated the
regulatory underpinnings and the funding framework for crucial components
of the national safety net, including social assistance, counselling and referral
services, child care, child welfare programs, community development services,
legal aid and services for persons with disabilities.
The authors proceed to demonstrate the especially negative consequences for women that
emanate from this restructuring. Perhaps the most important conclusion that they reach in the
context of this study is that “because social programs—and social and economic policy more
broadly—are a central means of realising equality commitments and redressing women’s
economic disadvantage, they must be designed with the goal of advancing women’s equality
at their heart” (Day and Brodsky 1998: 3). This proposition is one that should apply to all
social programs regardless of the vehicle used to deliver the program.
Canada’s restructuring of social programs is closely tied to the ongoing privatization of
responsibility for economic well-being. Privatization is another part of the picture that must
form part of the background as we consider the impact on women of using the tax system to
fund social programs. The detrimental impact of the process of privatization on women has
been well documented.27 In the context of this study, it is important to recognize that social
programs that are the focus of the study, such as child care and pensions, increasingly depend
on the private sector for their existence. As I demonstrate in my examination of the tax rules
that apply to social programs such as these, the tax subsidies are provided in a manner that
requires the private family or the private market to play an increasing role in the delivery of
these programs. Again, the implications of such a policy are, as I discuss, detrimental for
women.
There is another very important aspect to placing the analysis in the context of the socio-
economic realities of women’s lives. Women are not a monolithic group. Women have
differing social identities. Any analysis of the impact of the tax rules on women must take into
account the differences among women, such as race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, class and
disability. Consequently, for example, while one might argue that, because of their low
income, some women do not have the same access as men to certain tax expenditures, such
as those for contributions to registered retirement pension plans, one cannot merely deal with
the class dimension. A second question for consideration would be, for example: How is that
lack of entitlement complicated for lesbians who are also adversely affected by the non-
recognition of their relationships by the Act?
The lack of data is the most significant obstacle to including a thorough analysis of the
variations in differences among women. The tax statistics published by the Canada Customs
and Revenue Agency, which are based on information provided by taxpayers on their income
tax returns, do not include any breakdown of the information by reference to race, sexual
orientation or disability. Therefore, it is difficult to do more than make assumptions based on
other socio-economic statistics and, using those assumptions, extrapolate the impact of
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particular tax measures on different women. In a similar vein, very little has been written
about the impact of tax rules on differently situated women.28 For example, in Canada, there
is no literature on the impact of the tax system on women of colour, and it is only recently
that any such work has begun in the United States.29 Given the dearth of statistics and
literature on these important issues, it is clear steps should be taken to remedy this problem
so an informed analysis can be made on the impact of the tax rules on all women, regardless
of their social identity. While the primary focus of this study is gender and class, every effort
is made to raise issues about the impact on differently situated women of using the tax system
to fund social programs.
Identification of Tax Measures that Relate to Social Programs
The focus of this study is social programs subsidized by the tax system. A key question is,
therefore, what constitutes a social program? Interestingly, the social welfare literature does
not tend to define the term “social program.” Rather, that literature seems to consider the
meaning self-evident. For this study, I adopt a definition comprising four parts. Social
programs “must meet specific human needs; they must be publicly administered; they must
have full or partial public financing; and they must be available exclusively to residents of the
jurisdiction providing the program” (Amanor-Boadu and Martin 1994: i). This definition is to
be read in conjunction with the list of tax expenditures itemized in the latest tax expenditure
account issued by the Government of Canada. Furthermore, this study is limited to a discussion
of those tax rules that have a clear gendered impact and which disadvantage women in
comparison to men. Therefore, for example, measures such as the education tax credit, the
tuition fee credit, the student loan interest credit, the age credit, the pension income credit, the
GST tax credit and the medical expenses tax credit are not analyzed in the study.30 The federal
tax subsidies discussed in this study include:
• the child care expense deduction;
• the Canada Child Tax Benefit;
• the tax deduction for contributions to a registered pension plan;
• the tax deduction for contributions to a registered retirement pension plan;
• the sheltering of income from tax in both RPPs and RRSPs;
• the spousal tax credit;
• the ability to transfer unused credits to a spouse;
• the disability tax credit;
• the infirm dependant tax credit; and
• the caregiver tax credit.
Quebec measures that are discussed include the refundable child care expense tax credit, the
Quebec family allowance and the ascendant lodging tax credit.
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It is also important to note that the federal and provincial governments fund social programs in
several ways, including through the use of direct grants and subsidies other than tax
expenditures. Because the focus in this study is the tax system, I concentrate on the impact of
the tax rules on women, rather than an analysis of the interrelationship between tax-subsidized
social programs and programs subsidized in another manner. Nevertheless, it is important to
bear in mind that this interrelationship is a factor to be considered when decisions are made
about how best to subsidize a particular activity or endeavour.
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2: TAX SUBSIDIES RELATED TO CHILDREN
The tax system, however, is an inefficient, inequitable, and crude mechanism
for achieving any of the state objectives in relation to assisting families
supporting children (Brooks 1996: 51).
This chapter focusses on two tax measures that relate to the welfare of children and their
parents, namely the child care expense deduction and the Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB).
The underlying purpose of the provisions is explored and the issue of whether or not these
provisions achieve their intended effect is interrogated. The conclusion is that both these
measures need to be rethought in an effort to ensure they meet their intended purpose, and
the inequities that currently arise from the application of the provisions are eliminated.
Child Care Expense Deduction
Introduction
The use of the tax system to deliver a subsidy for child care in Canada came under intense
public scrutiny when Elizabeth Symes challenged the non-deductibility of child care expenses
as a business expense. That challenge, which began with a filing of a notice of objection to
Revenue Canada’s re-assessment for the 1983-86 taxation years denying the deduction of
these expenses, culminated in a ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada in December 1993
that child care expenses are not deductible in the computation of business income.1 The
majority of the Court held that because section 63 of the Income Tax Act provides for a
limited deduction for child care expenses, it precludes any further deduction under the Act. In
this part, I review the issue of funding child care through the tax system by way of a
deduction for child care expenses and the impact of this policy on women.
It is important to note that federal funding for child care in Canada is provided primarily
through the tax system, particularly, through a deduction in the computation of income
pursuant to section 63 of the Income Tax Act. Prior to April 1996, some funding was also
provided through the Canada Assistance Plan, a cost-sharing program with the provincial
governments, which provided limited assistance for “persons in need or likely to become in
need.”2 That plan has, however, been replaced by the Canada Health and Social Transfer
(CHST), a block-funding program by which the federal government transfers funds to the
provinces in the areas of health, post-secondary education and welfare. What is not clear is
the impact this change will have on child care programs and services previously funded under
CAP, although one of the stated purposes of the CHST is “to finance social programs in a
manner that will increase provincial flexibility.”3 One can assume that given the relative
unconditionality of this new funding method, there will be less adherence to national
standards.4 It likely also means that the trend of the early and mid-1990s toward cutting back
on provincial funding for child care will continue (Friendly 1995). Therefore, the role of the
tax deduction for child care expenses as the major subsidy for child care becomes especially
important.5
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Section 63 of the Act
Section 63 of the Income Tax Act provides the only direct federal relief for child care
expenses.6 The provision, introduced in 1972, was apparently intended to assist women with
children to enter the paid labour force. At the time of its introduction, the then Minister of
Finance, Edgar Benson (1969: 10) said: “The new plan is intended to primarily benefit
mothers who need to work to support their families.” It has become clear that if this is the
intention of the deduction it is, for many reasons, woefully inadequate. Section 63 permits a
deduction in the computation of income for child care expenses paid with respect to an
eligible child. Allowable child care expenses include amounts paid for babysitting services,
day nursery services and boarding school and camp fees, although there are weekly maximum
amounts prescribed for the latter two expenses. The child care expense must have been
incurred to enable the taxpayer or supporting person who resided with the child to perform
the duties of employment, carry on a business, carry on grant-funded research or attend a
designated educational institution or secondary school, subject to certain conditions.7
Section 63 defines an eligible child as a child of the taxpayer or taxpayer’s spouse, or a child
dependent on the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse, whose income does not exceed $7,044
for the 1999 taxation year.8 In addition, the child must be under 16 or a child in respect of
whom the disability tax credit is claimed. For the 1998 and subsequent taxation years, the
child care expense deduction is $7,000 for each child under 7 or a child in respect of whom
the disability tax credit is claimed, and $4,000 for each child aged 7 to 15, or a child who is
not eligible for the $7,000 deduction but who has a mental or physical infirmity.9 The
deductible amount is limited to the lesser of the amounts described or two thirds of the
taxpayer’s earned income for the year. In two-parent families, the deduction must be claimed
by the person earning the lower income, except where he or she is a full-time student, in
prison, incapable of caring for the children or living apart from the other person for at least
90 days by reason of the breakdown of their relationship. A recent change to rules introduced
in the 1996 budget means that lone parents or couples studying full time (including at high
school) are now permitted to deduct child care expenses against all types of income. This
change is to be welcomed as it allows women, who may be retraining to return to work, to
take advantage of the deduction.
History
The decision to fund child care partly through the tax system was implemented in 1972 as
part of an overall tax reform process. Since then, numerous reports on the general issue of
child care have been released. Despite the various recommendations made in these reports,
there has been remarkably little change in government policy. In 1984, for example, the
Commission on Equality in Employment, chaired by Rosalie Abella, argued that child care is
a necessity and not a luxury. This theme underlies many of the reports which followed. In
1986, the Task Force on Child Care (the Cooke Committee) conducted the most
comprehensive examination of child care to date (Status of Women 1986). It undertook 25
research projects, invited 1,200 groups to make submissions, received more than 200 briefs
and made 53 recommendations. Perhaps its most important recommendations were that “the
federal, provincial and territorial governments jointly develop complementary systems of
child care and parental leave that are as comprehensive, accessible and competent as our
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systems of health care and education,” and that “all new financing initiated by the federal
government be directed only to services that are licensed and monitored by provincial or
territorial governments” (Status of Women 1986: 373). The government responded to the
Cooke Committee’s report by establishing a parliamentary special committee (Martin
Committee), which proposed a $700 million child care package (Special Committee on Child
Care 1987). The Martin Report parted company with the Cooke Report on many issues, most
significantly in its recommendation that the child care expense deduction under section 63 of
the Income Tax Act be replaced by a refundable child care tax credit at a cost of $414 million,
thereby continuing partial reliance on the tax system to fund child care.
The Conservative Government’s response to both these reports was its announcement, in
December 1987, of the National Strategy on Child Care (Health and Welfare 1987). This
program proposed to increase the amount of the deduction for child care expenses and to
replace the day care provisions of the Canada Assistance Plan with a new scheme which
would commit the federal government to spending $4 billion over seven years on capital and
operating grants and increasing the number of day care spaces by 200,000. This plan was
included in the Canada Child Care Bill,10 introduced in 1986, but the legislation died on the
order paper when a general election was called in 1988. The Conservatives won the election
but on their return to power announced the withdrawal of the previously announced $4
billion investment to create new child care spaces. Two years later, the Government
announced it was abandoning its National Strategy. In 1995, the year that the Liberal
Government announced that the Canada Assistance Plan would be replaced by the CHST, it
also announced that it would spend $630 million over the following three to five years to split
the cost of expanding child care services for children 6 and under with the provinces (Globe
and Mail 1995: A1). As discussed in Chapter 1, the impact of the demise of the CAP has had
a profoundly negative effect on the provision of social services such as child care.11 As yet,
there is no national child care program, although there is some reason for optimism. In July
1999, a federal report proposing a $12 billion universal day care program was leaked to the
press, although there have been no new announcements on this issue since that time
(Vancouver Sun 1999: A6; National Post 1999b: B2). Given that there may be plans afoot to
inject more money into the funding of child care, it is important to rethink the role of the tax
system and consider the strengths and weaknesses of this method of funding.
Women and Child Care
Child care has been, and is perceived as, a women’s issue, but we must be careful about
identifying it solely as such, as this only perpetuates the notion that women should be
responsible for the care of children. While research shows that child care is still performed
primarily by women,12 some feminists argue that the sharing of child care responsibilities by
women and their male partners is an essential step in women’s struggle for equality.13
Nevertheless, studies show that although men are spending more time with their children and
thus may be playing a more significant role in their lives, women still devote considerably
more time than men to primary child care.14 Statistics show that while 67 percent of mothers
spend some time on these activities on a daily basis, only 33 percent of fathers do so (Harvey
et al. 1991). It is also women who primarily make the child care arrangements for their
children (Beach 1992: 7). Another example of the responsibility taken by women for children
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during the regular work week is that the number of days women take off work for family
reasons increased from an average of 1.9 days a year in 1977 to 5.2 days in 1990. Men’s time
off work for family responsibilities has remained relatively static during the same time period,
increasing slightly from 0.7 days in 1977 to 0.9 days in 1990 (Akyeampong 1992). Finally,
while 19.9 percent of women cited caring for their children as a reason for working part time,
only 1.0 percent of men gave that as the reason for working part time (Statistics Canada
1999c: 33, Table 26). Furthermore, more women than men leave the paid labour force
entirely to care for their children. Clearly, child care responsibilities have a significant impact
on women’s participation in the paid labour force.
The lack of affordable, accessible child care is a significant impediment to entry or re-entry in
the paid labour force for women with children. For example, in Canada a report by the
National Council of Welfare (1993: 41) makes the point that the shortage of adequate and
affordable child care creates a serious disincentive for women to seek work. “In study after
study, the usual finding has been that the presence of children, and particularly the presence
of children younger than six years of age, substantially reduces both the probability that a
woman will work and her expected hours if she does work” (Nakamura and Nakamura 1985:
178). Women who would normally receive low wages in the labour force and who face the
high costs of suitable child care, which normally costs several thousand dollars a year or more
per child, may find it more economical to stay at home. This reality is recognized by the
Government of Canada (1994: 53) in its 1994 Discussion Paper that states: “In many cases,
the lack of affordable, high quality child care is an insurmountable barrier to a job.”15 For
some women, it means not working outside the home; for others, it means part-time work,
shift work or work at a location close to home. Indeed, 1994 Canadian statistics indicate that
women form almost 70 percent of the part-time labour force and 26 percent of employed
women worked part time (Statistics Canada 1978b: 9). Further, one quarter of women aged
25 to 44 working part time cited personal or family responsibilities as the reason for working
part time (Lero and Johnson 1994: 5). Along similar lines, 7.6 percent or 298,000 women
aged 16 to 64 who were on welfare or Unemployment Insurance during 1988-1990 left their
jobs because of “family responsibilities,” the most common of which would presumably be
caring for children. This is compared with a mere 1.2 percent, or 48,000 men, who cited
family responsibilities as their reason for leaving their jobs (NCW 1993: 17-19).
The lack of available child care is clearly linked to women’s economic inequality relative to
men. As mentioned, women earn less than men. One contributing factor is that the part-time
work so many women perform is less remunerative than comparable full-time work. Women
may also work in jobs that require fewer overtime hours or that allow them unpaid leave
during school vacation. Women without access to child care also forego education or training
opportunities that could lead to jobs with higher salaries. It should be stressed that this is not
just a workplace equality issue. Women’s abilities to pursue other activities, both in and
outside the home, are also affected by their child care responsibilities. This may manifest itself
in several ways, including the inability of women with children to engage in remunerative
activities in the home, such as artistic endeavours, or non-remunerative but socially vital
activities outside the home such as volunteer work. In fact, one recommendation made by the
Canadian Advisory Committee on the Status of Women (1986: 3) in its brief to the Cooke
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Committee was that “child care services should be available to those parents who have no
paid employment for a maximum of one day a week.”
The Tax System
Given that the child care expense deduction is the primary method of funding child care in
Canada, it is important to ensure that it operates in a fair and equitable manner and that it
achieves its stated objective of removing the impediment to women’s participation in the paid
labour force. In fact, on close examination, the limitations of section 63, as an effective subsidy
for child care, are readily apparent. Perhaps most notably, the amount that may be deducted
does not reflect the actual cost of child care. Indeed, this limitation was readily apparent when
Elizabeth Symes argued that she be permitted to deduct her child care expenses from business
income. If successful, she would not have been subject to the current monetary ceiling on the
deductible amount. As mentioned, that ceiling is extremely low. The maximum amount
deductible under section 63 is only $7,000 a year for a child under 7. This translates to a
subsidy of only $3,500 a year for a woman who pays tax at a high rate of 50 percent, while a
woman who pays tax at a lower rate of 20 percent will receive even less, that is $1,400 as her
subsidy. Given the high cost of child care in Canada, this amount is clearly inadequate. The
cost of child care varies from province to province and is also affected by the nature of the care
(i.e., whether it is provided in the home or in a child care facility). In 1988, the Canadian
National Child Care Study estimated the cost of regulated child care at $7,188 a year for
infants and $5,361 for preschoolers (Pence 1992: 396). Since that time, the costs have risen
considerably with estimates running at a high of $9,396 for infants and almost $6,000 for
preschoolers.16
The inadequacy of the amount of the section 63 deduction is exacerbated by the fact that
section 63 provides a deduction from income, which ties the value of the deduction to the
taxpayer’s tax rate. This means that a woman paying tax at a high rate receives a larger tax
subsidy than a woman paying at a lower rate. Such a system establishes a hierarchy of
taxpayers which is in inverse relation to their ability to pay for child care. At the top are those
with the highest incomes. Below them, in declining order, are taxpayers with lower incomes.
At the bottom are taxpayers to whom the deduction is worthless because they have little or
no income to which to apply the deduction. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that those
with higher incomes tend to claim a greater amount as the child care expense deduction than
those with lower incomes. For example, figures based on tax statistics for the 1996 tax year
(latest figures available) show that the average amount deducted by women with an income
of more than $50,000 was $2,511; women with an income under $20,000 deducted less than
half that amount with an average deduction of $988.17 Therefore, the tax system compounds
the already existing problem of those with higher incomes getting a greater share of the tax
subsidy.
The requirement that couples allocate the deduction to the lower income person also limits
the value of the deduction. This problem arises because the deduction will be applied to
reduce income that is taxed at the lower rate, thereby resulting in less taxes saved than would
have been the case if the deduction was taken by the high-rate taxpayer.
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As mentioned, the deductible amount is the lesser of the allowable portion of the expense and
two thirds of the taxpayer’s earned income. “Earned income” includes employment income,
business income, disability payments made under the CPP/QPP, training allowances and
scholarship monies. Employment Insurance benefits are not earned income, nor are spousal
or child support payments, even though these amounts may be required to be included in
income.18 Therefore, a mother whose income is a combination of spousal support payments
and employment income, for example, may only apply her child care expenses to reduce her
employment income. This means that when her employment income is reduced to zero by the
child care expenses, she may not apply the unused portion of the expenses to reduce the tax
on her spousal support payments. Another problem with the requirement that child care
expenses can only be applied to reduce earned income is that women who are looking for
employment and whose only source of income is Employment Insurance cannot deduct child
care expenses they incur while seeking a job. Again, the limitations of the tax provision mean
there is no subsidy for the individual who may need it most.
Section 63(1) provides that in order to deduct child care expenses, a taxpayer must file receipts
with the Minister of National Revenue and the receipts must include the social insurance
number of the individual providing the child care services. Although Revenue Canada’s
administrative practice is that the receipts need not be submitted when the return is filed, the
requirement to submit is a statutory requirement that can be enforced at any time. This is a
highly unusual requirement given that for most other deductions, the legislation specifically
provides that receipts need only be produced on the demand of the Minister. The problem with
the requirement in the child care context is that, in many instance, receipts are not provided by
the caregiver, reflecting the often informal nature of many child care arrangements. It has been
stated that “most (63 percent) working mothers with preschool children do not get receipts for
child care and do not plan to file a claim” (Cleveland and Hyatt 1997: 22). The requirement for
receipts for an expense incurred so frequently in the informal market puts a far more onerous
burden on a taxpayer than, for instance, the requirement for receipts for business expenses,
which are generally incurred in the formal market where issuance of receipts is the norm. There
is a second aspect to this issue. The statutory requirement that the receipt include the social
insurance number of the child care provider is problematic.19 Presumably, the reason is to
minimize the number of fraudulent claims and to ensure that, where the deduction is taken, the
payee includes the amount in her income. Yet why child care expenses are singled out for this
restriction and not, for example, moving expenses deducted is not clear.
The requirement to include the social insurance number of the caregiver on the receipt is sexist
because it is in respect of a deduction for an expense primarily incurred by women for services
also primarily provided by women. There are also racial implications. Child care services,
particularly in the private sector are often provided by immigrant women who are frequently
women of colour.20 By statutorily requiring child care workers to provide their social insurance
numbers, while not requiring the same of providers of other tax deductible services, the
government places an added burden primarily on these immigrant women. The rationale for
this policy is questionable, particularly in light of the fact that child care workers are so grossly
underpaid. Many of those providing the service do not earn enough to be liable for income tax,
so the requirement for the provision of their social insurance numbers is not strictly a tax
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enforcement measure. If, as one suspects, it is really an attempt to enforce the Immigration
Act21 and to ensure only those with legal status in Canada, who are consequently able to secure
a social insurance number, may work in Canada, then it is highly inappropriate to use tax
legislation in this manner. It is also probably ineffective. Denying the tax deduction to a woman
who is trying to obtain child care in a market where the demand is significant and the supply
limited does not automatically result in her use only of those providers who have social
insurance numbers. It often simply means she resorts to the informal market and the provision
of services in the underground economy. Surely, the rules that apply to other deductible
expenses—that receipts be maintained and submitted on demand—should also apply to child
care expenses.
Child care is only considered an eligible expense if it is not provided by a parent of the child
or a person under 18 who is related to the taxpayer.22 This restriction has a harsher effect on
some women. First Nations children, for example, are often cared for within the extended
family unit, and care may be given by siblings or other relatives under 18 years of age.23 Low-
income women who cannot afford to purchase child care services often rely on relatives,
including siblings of the child, to provide child care at a cost less than that incurred in either
the formal or extra-familial market. In both examples, because the Income Tax Act recognizes
only those child care arrangements that fit within the traditional White middle class norm, the
subsidy for child care is denied to those who may need it most. Whether the deduction should
be available for care by a person under 18 is a complicated issue. But, it is important to
recognize the limitations of the current rule with respect to what is an eligible child care
expense, and its differential impact on the groups mentioned above, in order to determine
what policy might be more appropriate to remedy these inequities.
The Symes Decision
The issue of subsidizing child care through the tax system received tremendous attention
because of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Symes.24 In Symes the taxpayer, a full-
time practising lawyer and, at that time, a partner in a law firm, claimed that her child care
expenses should be deductible as a business expense under section 9 and paragraph 18(1)(a)
of the Income Tax Act. Section 9 provides that a taxpayer’s income from business is the
profit from the business and paragraph 18(1)(a) provides that no expense is deductible
“except to the extent that it was made or incurred by the taxpayer for the purpose of gaining
or producing income from the business.” Symes made a two-part argument. She contended,
first, that the salary paid to the nanny who cared for her children was a business expense
incurred to gain or produce income. Had she not had child care help, she would not have
been able to practise law and, consequently, would have earned no income from her business.
Second, she argued that to disallow her the deduction was to deny her equal benefit of the
law on the basis of her sex. This disallowance was in contravention of section 15(1) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,25 because it has a disproportionate impact on
women who are primarily responsible for child care.
At the Federal Court (Trial Division),26 Cullen J. held that Ms. Symes’s expenses should be
deductible for two reasons. He found, first, that the issue had to be interpreted in light of the
“social and economic realities of the times.”27 He relied on the expert evidence of Dr. Patricia
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Armstrong, a sociologist, that the influx of women with children into the work force in the
1970s and 1980s represented a significant social change. He then held that Symes had
“exercised good business and commercial judgment in deciding to dedicate part of her
resources from the law practice to the provision of child care”28 and that, consequently, the
child care expenses were deductible as a business expense. Even though he found for Ms.
Symes on his interpretation of the Act, Cullen J. went further and held that Revenue
Canada’s denial of the deduction was discrimination against Ms. Symes on the basis of her
sex, noting that as a result she was “not treated like a serious business person with a serious
expense incurred for a legitimate purpose.”29
That decision was overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal. Décary J.A., writing for the
Court, held that child care expenses were not a business expense under paragraph 18(1)(a)
because they were a “parental” expense under section 63 and were only deductible in
accordance with that section.30 He also rejected Ms. Symes’s Charter argument because,
unlike Cullen J., who viewed Ms. Symes as a businesswoman standing next to a businessman,
Décary J.A. chose to compare Ms. Symes to other women who did not earn business income.
He pointed out that Ms. Symes was not arguing that, if she were successful, the Income Tax
Act would then discriminate against women employees in favour of self-employed women.
He stated: “I am not prepared to concede that professional women make up a disadvantaged
group against whom a form of discrimination recognized by section 15 has been
perpetrated.”31
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal and, in so
doing, split along gender lines with the majority of the Court consisting of all the male judges
while the only two women on the Court, L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ., were in
dissent. 32 The majority held that the expenses were not deductible under section 9 and
paragraph 18(1)(a) of the Act because, as Iacobucci J. wrote, “the Income Tax Act intends to
address child care expenses, and does so in fact, entirely within s. 63.”33 He endorsed Décary
J.A.’s description of section 63 as a self-contained and complete code for the deduction of
child care expenses, which precludes any further deduction for these expenses. He also
characterized the Charter issue in terms of whether section 63 of the Act disproportionately
limited the deduction with respect to child care expenses incurred by women. He reached the
decision that it did not. Iacobucci J. said: “[T]he appellant taxpayer has failed to demonstrate
an adverse effect created or contributed to by s. 63, although she has overwhelmingly
demonstrated how the issue of child care negatively affects women in employment terms.
Unfortunately, proof that women pay the social costs is not sufficient proof that women pay
child care expenses.”34 In her dissent, L’Heureux-Dubé J. strongly disagreed with Iacobucci
J. saying that Symes “has proven that she has incurred an actual and calculable price for child
care and that this cost is disproportionately incurred by women.”35
Indeed, L’Heureux-Dubé J. disagreed on all these issues. She held that the child care expense
was deductible under section 9 and paragraph 18(1)(a) as a business expense. She stated, first,
that the presence of section 63 did not preclude the deduction of child care expenses under
another provision of the Act. She then asked whether the expenses ought to be deductible as
business expenses. She found that the necessity of child care for women with children who
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wish to participate in the paid labour force should be acknowledged. L’Heureux-Dubé J. also
discussed the gender-biased nature of the relevant tax provisions, describing the interpretation
of “business expense” as one “wrought with male perspective and subjectivity.”36 She
concluded: “The concept of business expense should be interpreted in a way that takes into
account the realities of businesswomen’s expenses in relation to child care.”37
The facts in Symes illustrate many of the problems inherent in the operation of section 63,
including the inadequate amount of the subsidy. Those problems form a subtext to the Symes
case and the remedy sought by the appellant. Put generally, any legal challenge to a tool used
to deliver a subsidy is first constrained by the limitations of that tool. In the case of child care,
those limitations make it very difficult to deliver the subsidy in an equitable manner. Indeed,
Symes provides a graphic illustration of this point.
Contrary to the reaction one might expect, many women applauded the decision of the
Supreme Court. The reason was that had Symes been successful, only some women would
have benefited. This is because while the Act allows self-employed taxpayers to deduct
expenses incurred to gain or produce income, subsection 8(2) specifically prohibits the
deduction of expenses incurred to earn employment income, unless they are specifically listed
in the Act. Ms. Symes claimed a deduction for child care expenses in the computation of her
business income, a deduction which, had she been successful, would not have been available to
the vast majority of women. Women form only 32 percent of the self-employed in Canada.38 If
the Act is used to subsidize child care for the self-employed, the result is merely more privilege
for the already privileged. Since the government has acknowledged that funding for child care
is limited, success for Ms. Symes and a consequent diversion of existing funds (or a limited
amount of new funding) to only the self-employed might have been inappropriate. It could
have served to reinforce the inequitable division of the subsidy, to the detriment of those who
are already economically or socially disadvantaged. Furthermore, if child care expenses had
been held to be a deductible business expense, they would have been deductible by all business
persons, including men. Because women earn approximately 70 percent of what men earn, it
seems likely that in heterosexual couples in which both partners earn business income and incur
child care expenses, the male partner would take the deduction since it would be worth more
to the partner with the greater income. As men form over 67 percent of the self-employed,39 it
is also likely that the male partner would be the only one able to take advantage of this
deduction. Obviously, this result would have been inconsistent with the policy underlying the
current section 63 deduction for child care expenses, which is to reduce the disincentive for
women to participate in the paid labour force.
Is There a Role for the Tax System?
The preceding analysis raises the issue of whether the Income Tax Act should be the vehicle
by which the subsidy for child care is delivered. Opinion among child care advocacy groups
and others is divided. The Cooke Committee, for example, was opposed to the provision of
new funding for child care through the Act. The National Council of Welfare (1988: 31),
responding to the Conservative Government’s National Child Care Strategy, agreed stating:
“Unlike the federal strategy, which perpetuates the old system of a mix of subsidies for child
care and tax benefits for parents, our alternative puts all available resources into child care
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services and none into tax breaks.” The Canadian Advisory Committee on the Status of
Women (1986: 10) also advocated less reliance on the tax system in its brief to the Cooke
Committee. Members of the Women and Tax Working Group of the Ontario Fair Tax
Commission were divided on the issue of using the tax system to deliver this subsidy.40 Even
a Supreme Court of Canada judge has had her say on this issue. In Symes, L’Heureux-Dubé
J. raised the issue of whether section 63 of the Act could ever achieve its goals when she
said:
I am not unaware that income tax deductions are undoubtedly not the best
way for the government to provide assistance with regard to the high cost of
child care and that the allowed deductions under s. 63 are not representative
of the real cost of child care. Perhaps child care should not even be subsidized
through the tax system but, rather, provided for in another manner.41
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against using the tax system is that this method of
subsidization contributes to the privatization of child care. Put simply, the funds allocated to
child care are, through a combination of factors, being directed toward financing child care in
the private sphere—either the family or the private market. Unlike direct subsidies paid in the
form of operating or capital grants to non-profit child care facilities, tax subsidies are
received by individuals and may be in respect of any child care expense. There are few limits
on the forms of the child care that qualify for the subsidy. That is, they may be any child care
service provided by any person, other than—in the case of the current section 63 deduction—
the parent of the child or a relative under 18 years of age. But it is irrelevant for tax purposes
whether the child care is provided by the private sector (through the family or other in-home
caregivers) or the public sector (through licensed day care facilities) or, indeed, in unlicensed
day care facilities that may be run for profit or not.
The problem is exacerbated by the lack of affordable, accessible child care in Canada, a
problem that has been well documented.42 It has been estimated that less than 17 percent of
children 12 years of age or younger who require care for 20 hours a week are served by
licensed child care arrangements (Harder 1995: 9). The raw figures are startling with 3.2
million children requiring child care and only just over 360,000 regulated child care spaces
(Harder 1995: 8). It is little wonder that the majority of parents report difficulties in finding
child care for their children. Taken together, the lack of spaces and the non-accountability for
the nature of the child care that gives rise to the tax deductible expense results in recourse in
many instances to family members as the provider of child care. As Sandra Harder (1995: 13)
points out: “Unlicensed family home care is the most prevalent type of child care in Canada.”
While this state of affairs may be acceptable to some, it presents problems for others,
including those without family members able to provide child care and those who prefer not
to have to resort to their families for child care. The role of the government (using the tax
system as the tool to deliver the subsidy) in this scenario is complex. It does provide a
subsidy for child care and, in that respect, takes some responsibility for the provision of child
care and recognizes that it is not the sole responsibility of the family. But, at the same time,
the government ceases to play a direct role once that subsidy has been provided, leaving the
availability and nature of the child care to the private sector—the family or the private
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market. By channeling the subsidy in this manner rather than toward the construction and
operation of licensed child care facilities, the government limits the options of women with
respect to child care.
It is important to note that Quebec has taken a very different approach to the issue of funding
child care. In 1997, the Quebec government created le ministère de la Famille et l’Enfance
and introduced a new “family” policy. Part of that policy included the establishment of
optional full-time kindergarten for all children 5 years old. Concurrently, in September 1997
early childhood centres were created to provide children under 5 with early childhood
education and child care services. Since that time, the Quebec government has moved
forward with its $5 a day child care program. Under this program, which is to be extended to
all children under 5 by the year 2000, parents pay $5 a child for child care at an early
childhood centre. Those parents who do not have access to those centres continue to receive
the Quebec refundable child care tax credit under the Quebec Taxation Act.43 Thus, Quebec
has embarked on a policy that is moving away from using tax subsidies to fund child care to a
recognition that a better approach is to fund child care directly.44
Options for Reform
Given the previous analysis, should child care funding be taken completely out of the tax
system? Alternatively, can the current tax rules be improved to overcome the deficiencies
described earlier? If improvements can be made, would they satisfy the concerns of those
currently opposed to using the tax system to deliver this subsidy? These are key questions
that must be answered in order to ensure that the subsidy for child care is delivered in the
most efficient and fair manner possible.
My starting proposition is that child care funding through the tax system is not, and can never
be, the total solution to the current child care crisis. It is important to recognize the role the
tax system has to play as only one part of a multi-faceted strategy aimed at providing
affordable, accessible child care. Despite the numerous reports and recommendations made
over the years, many of which have recommended an approach to the funding of child care
that is not so reliant on tax measures, the tax system remains its primary source of funding. In
1995, the total amount expended through section 63 of the Income Tax Act was $395 million
and the estimate for the 2000 taxation year is that this amount will increase to $570 million
(Dept. of Finance 1999a, Table 1). While there have been indications that the government is
considering a more universal day care program (National Post 1999b: 20), there is no firm
commitment to date. This factor, together with the inequities of the current tax deduction,
indicates that it is time for an overhaul of the child care expense deduction.
Conversion of the deduction to a refundable tax credit
A major improvement that would redress some of the problems discussed above would be to
convert the current deduction to a tax credit. Such a conversion would mean that two women
who spend the same on child care but who pay tax at different rates would receive the same
subsidy. In other words, the woman who pays tax at a lower rate would no longer receive
less of the subsidy than the woman who pays tax at a higher rate. This is not a novel
suggestion and has been suggested by many groups, including the National Council of
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Welfare (1988: 20), the National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL 1991b: 6) and
the Women and Taxation Working Group of the Ontario Fair Tax Commission (1992: 31).
Furthermore, the credit could be made refundable, meaning that women who do not have
taxable income could also receive a subsidy. Such a refundable tax credit could be modelled
on the GST tax credit and provided by way of a quarterly payment. Providing the benefit up
front and on a regular basis instead of delaying “payment” until a tax return is filed would
recognize the recurring nature of child care costs. In this regard, it should be noted that, as
mentioned above, Quebec provides a refundable tax credit for child care expenses. Many of
the Quebec rules are similar to the federal section 63 deduction. A significant difference is
that the amount of the refundable credit is calculated using a progressive rate structure based
on family income. From 1998 onward, the tax credit is based on the excess net family income
over a threshold of $26,000.45
Increase in the amount of the deduction
The amount of the credit should also bear a closer relationship to the actual cost of child care
than does the current deduction. This latter change could also go some way toward remedying
the undervaluation of child care work. In 1996, for example, the average salary of child care
workers was $19,700, placing them among the 25 lowest paid professions in Canada (Globe
and Mail 1998: A4). All indications are that child care remains highly undervalued. A recent
report has found: “The income levels of the child care workforce are low and present a major
human resource issue for the child care sector” (Beach et al. 1998: 77). The inordinately low
salaries paid to child care workers are somewhat puzzling given the high demand for child care
and the shortage of places in child care facilities. One would expect market forces to prevail
and push salaries upward. That this has not happened is further evidence of the role that the
invisibility of child care labour and its stereotyping as women’s work plays in contributing to
its undervaluation. Raising the amount of the tax subsidy would go some way to remedying
this problem.
Remove restrictions on the definition of “earned income” and extend the availability of
the deduction
An important question is whether the restrictions on the types of activity that currently
qualify the taxpayer to claim the deduction should be retained. As mentioned, the Income Tax
Act limits the deduction to taxpayers who need child care in order to work outside the home
in the paid labour force, to take occupational training, to carry on grant-funded research or to
attend a designated educational institution or secondary school. It is clear that for many
women the government’s stated policy of removing impediments to their full participation in
the labour force is meaningless. For example, women with children who are actively seeking
employment and women who take non-eligible training or skills-updating courses after
childbirth cannot deduct their child care expenses. Furthermore, the definition of earned
income also limits the availability of the subsidy. As discussed above, women who rely on
spousal support for the bulk of their income cannot receive the subsidy even though they
must include spousal support in their income. It is not earned income within the definition in
section 63 and, therefore, they cannot deduct their child care expenses. Lack of affordable,
accessible child care is more than an issue of workplace equality. The needs of women who
choose to work in the home and care for their children in that environment should also be
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recognized. Consideration should be given to drafting entitlement to the credit in a manner
that does not tie it so closely to activities that are related to earning income outside the home.
The subsidy for child care expenses should take into account the needs of all women with
children who are studying or training prior to re-entering the paid labour force.46
Ensure that all those eligible claim the deduction
There is also evidence that many women eligible to claim the child care expense deduction do
not do so. Indeed, a recent article states that less than 40 percent of those who should receive
the child care expense deduction actually receive the benefit (Cleveland and Hyatt 1997: 22).
Since the tax system is the primary method of funding child care, it would make sense for the
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency to embark on an advertising campaign to inform
women about the availability of the current deduction. If the deduction is converted to a
refundable tax credit, it is even more critical that it be well advertised in order to encourage
women with no taxable income who might otherwise not file a return to do so. Advertising
entitlement to a tax credit is not a novel concept, having been undertaken with respect to the
Goods and Services Tax credit.
As mentioned above, one barrier to access to the child care expense deduction is that the
social insurance number of the caregiver must be provided on the receipt for the child care
expenses. Consequently, removal of that requirement would improve access to the deduction.
Indeed, it makes sense to treat the child care expense deduction in the same manner as other
deductions in the computation of income and merely require that receipts for the expense be
produced on demand by the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency.
Give tax incentives for the construction and operation of child care facilities
It is clear that the demand for places in licensed child care facilities significantly exceeds the
number of places available. There is a role for the tax system in this regard. In addition to
providing subsidies to individuals who incur child care expenses, other measures could be
introduced with the aim of increasing the number of child care spaces in licensed facilities. One
measure could be to provide an accelerated capital cost allowance for capital expenditures
associated with the cost of constructing and operating child care facilities. This would permit
those who construct or operate these facilities, often employers, to claim a deduction for
depreciation of the assets at a rate in excess of the actual rate of depreciation. This could result
in a significant tax saving. Capital cost allowance is, of course, available for these expenditures
at varying rates depending on the nature of the capital asset. Increasing it to, for example, 100
percent for the capital costs associated with the construction of a building, would ensure a full
deduction of those expenditures once the building was in use. Furthermore, if accelerated
capital cost allowances were available for capital assets, such as equipment acquired during the
operation of the child care facilities, the tax subsidy would continue beyond the period of
immediate use and form an ongoing tax incentive.
Conclusion
In an ideal world, there would be a national child care program through which the state and
society generally would take more responsibility for the regulation and provision of the
service. Unfortunately, there has never been such a program in Canada. The demise of the
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proposed National Strategy on Child Care and the absence of a replacement program suggest
that creating such a program is not imminent. It is important to ensure, therefore, that the
current system is not merely dismissed as flawed. Rather, steps should be taken to recognize
its weaknesses and to improve tax measures so they are more fair and responsive to the needs
of women with children.
Canada Child Tax Benefit
Introduction
The Child Tax Benefit, a refundable tax credit, was implemented effective January 1, 1993. It
replaced the refundable child tax credit, the non-refundable tax credit for dependent children
and the family allowances program. In 1998, it was revamped and renamed the Canada Child
Tax Benefit (CCTB).47 In order to get a sense of the parameters of the benefit and whether or
not it applies in an equitable manner, it is necessary to trace its history.
In 1945, the Family Allowances Act,48 Canada’s first universal welfare payment program was
enacted.49 The espoused purpose of the program was to help redress the inadequacy of
postwar wages by providing economic support to families with children. As Jane Ursel has
commented: “Family allowances represented the compromise between capital and labour in
its most naked form—subsidizing a wage system designed to ignore reproductive costs, only
to perpetuate it.”50 In 1973, the Income Tax Act was amended to require the inclusion in
income of family allowances.51 While this measure was enacted in order to introduce some
progressivity to the family allowance because individuals would be taxed at their marginal
rate on amounts received, it also heralded the future demise of the universality of family
allowances. Even though all taxpayers would receive the family allowance, the net after-tax
value would vary depending on the taxpayer’s marginal rate. In 1979, the federal refundable
child tax credit was introduced, a measure that was intended, in part, to replace family
allowance payments.52 The child tax credit was tied to family income and the amount of the
credit was reduced by five percent of the amount by which the income of the individual and
the supporting person (usually the parents of the child) exceeded $18,000. The universality of
family allowances was extinguished in 1989 when the tax-back of family allowances was
introduced. From 1989 until the family allowance system was abolished in 1992, a tax-back
rate of 15 percent applied to taxpayers’ net incomes over $50,000 and in two-parent families,
the tax-back was applied to the income of the taxpayer with the higher income in the
relationship.53
The original Child Tax Benefit provided a basic benefit of $1,020 for each child which
represented the amount of the maximum family allowance and the refundable child tax credit.
There were supplements for families with more than two children, and the full amount of the
benefit was paid to families with income up to $25,921. The amount of the benefit was
gradually reduced for families with incomes above that amount. In addition, there was an
earned income supplement as an added incentive to low-income working families. There is no
doubt that the Child Tax Benefit was the subject of much criticism by social policy
organizations and children’s advocates. This critique was encapsulated by Ken Battle (1993:
429) who said: “Their major criticisms concerned the new scheme’s lack of protection from
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inflation, weak impact on family poverty, differential treatment of welfare and unemployed
families, and lack of responsiveness to changes in family income, as well as its formal
abolition of universal child benefits.”
The Tax Rules
The 1997 federal budget proposed changes to the Child Tax Benefit and, effective July 1,
1998, it was reincarnated as the Canada Child Tax Benefit.54 The CCTB includes a basic
benefit, and the National Child Benefit is a supplement for lower income families (formerly
the working income supplement). The CCTB is payable monthly to the parent who is the
primary caregiver of the child, and the amount of the payment is reduced and eventually
eliminated as annual “family” income increases beyond a threshold limit which, for the 1999
taxation year, is set at $27,750 and, for the 2000 taxation year, at $29,590. There is also a
rebuttable presumption that the primary caregiver of the child is the “female parent,” as the
Income Tax Act describes it.55 For July 1999, the amount of the basic benefit is $1,020 for the
first child, supplemented by $785 per year for each child under 7 in respect of whom no child
care expenses are deducted under section 63 of the Act. (A family with four children would
receive a basic benefit of $4,230 with a supplement of $2,390.) For 2000, the supplement
increases to $955 for the first child. If child care expenses are deducted, the amount of the
supplemental amount is reduced by 25 percent of the expenses deducted under section 63.
Problems with the Canada Child Tax Benefit
Much has been written about the inadequacies of the Canada Child Tax Benefit.56 As
discussed elsewhere in this chapter, women are the primary caregivers for children.57 Indeed,
this role is recognized in the terms of the CCTB, which includes a presumption that in two-
parent families the “female parent” is the primary caregiver of the child, and it is the primary
caregiver who is entitled to the benefit. The importance of the CCTB for women is evidenced
by the fact that more women than men head lone-parent families and the number of lone-
parent families is increasing.58 Aboriginal women and women of colour are more likely to be
lone parents than White women (Statistics Canada 1992, Table 1.9), and single mothers with
children are the poorest of the poor.59 Women and children’s poverty are inextricably linked.
Any evaluation of the CCTB must take place in a manner that recognizes the role of women
as the primary caregivers of children and the link between women and their children’s
poverty. The CCTB is a tax measure that is highly gendered in its impact, being one that is
primarily targeted at, and enjoyed by, women.
Targeting problems
One major weakness of the CCTB is its limited application. The CCTB, particularly the
National Child Benefit portion of the program, is targeted at the working poor. The 1997
changes did not address directly the needs of those women with children who receive social
assistance. As Ken Battle (1999: 48) has pointed out, “the National Child Tax Benefit will not
increase child benefits for welfare families and will augment child benefits only for low-income
families not on welfare (i.e., working poor and low-income employment insurance families).”
Women’s ability to participate fully in the paid labour force is, as discussed earlier in this
chapter, adversely affected by their primary caregiving role for their children. The result is that
there are many women who cannot “afford” to participate in the paid labour force. Women
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who cannot participate in the paid labour force receive less of a benefit than their counterparts
who do participate in the paid labour force. Yet, in many instances it is women on social
assistance who are most in need of financial assistance and statistics show that it is
predominantly women who receive social assistance.60 There is another dimension to this issue.
Women with disabilities are particularly disadvantaged by the linking of the CTTB to work
force participation. Statistics show that women with disabilities who have dependent children
have a very low rate of participation in the paid labour force. In 1991, for example, only 48
percent of women with disabilities were in the paid labour force, and women with disabilities
with dependent children were more unlikely than non-disabled women with children to be
employed (Fawcett 1996: 159-160). The problem is that by tying the amount of the CCTB
received to work status, the poverty of many women and their children is further entrenched.
Inflation
The CCTB is not fully indexed to inflation. Section 122.61(5) of the Income Tax Act
provides that if inflation exceeds three percent in a given year, then the amount of the CCTB
will be increased by the percentage that the Consumer Price Index exceeds three percent.
This rule means that in any year that inflation is less than three percent, there is no adjustment
to the amount of the CCTB, even though it has been eroded in value by the inflation. In years
in which inflation is more than three percent, the value of the CCTB will drop by three
percent because of the three percent floor imposed by section 122.61(5). This form of partial
indexation is estimated to save the government $170 million a year (Battle 1999: 58).
Because so many women with children rely so heavily on the CCTB, these funds should be
redirected to enhancing the CCTB.
Reduction in the amount of the child care expense
The reduction in the amount of the CCTB received for each child under 7 by 25 percent of
any child care expenses deducted under section 63 of the Income Tax Act is an added burden
for those women who need child care to participate in the paid labour force. Given the lack of
affordable child care and the inadequate amount of the deduction under section 63, any extra
cost, such as losing part of the child care expense deduction in order to claim the full amount
of the CCTB is unfair.
CCTB not claimed by all who are entitled to the benefit
A key issue with respect to a refundable tax credit, such as the CCTB, is that its success as a
social program depends on individuals claiming the tax credit. Because the program is
delivered as a refundable tax credit, payment depends on an individual filing a tax return and
claiming the credit. In the case of an individual with a spouse, the spouse must also file a
return because the amount of the CCTB is based on a calculation that takes “family” income
into account. Unfortunately, many women are not claiming benefits to which they are
entitled. In 1998, Revenue Canada confirmed that five percent of women who had a baby in
1995 or 1996 did not claim the Child Tax Benefit (the forerunner of the CCTB). And, almost
10 percent of potential Child Tax Benefit claimants had their benefits interrupted or did not
receive benefits to which they were entitled because they or their spouses did not file income
tax returns on time (Minister of Revenue 1998). These figures are unacceptable, given the
importance of the CCTB to women and children. In addition, there is a class aspect to this
35
problem. It is very likely that those who do not claim the CCTB are those women who need
it most, that is, low-income women. Because their income is so low, these women do not pay
tax and, therefore, are less likely to complete a tax return. There are also many women,
especially those on social assistance, who do not have a fixed address at which to receive the
payments, and they too may not receive the amount to which they are entitled.
Options for reform
The fundamental issue when considering the effectiveness of the CCTB is whether the tax
system is the appropriate tool by which to deliver the program. What makes this issue so
pertinent is that it is only relatively recently that the tax system began to be used to deliver
this subsidy. Until 1992, the family allowance was a direct grant made to the mothers of all
children under the age of 18. The tax system was not used to deliver the subsidy, although as
discussed above, it was used to limit the amount of the subsidy. Has the integration of the
family allowance into the tax system contributed to a better targeted subsidy and improved its
delivery? I would suggest, given the problems outlined above, that the answer is no.
Consideration might be given to removing the family allowance portion of the CCTB from
the tax measure and delivering it by way of a direct grant.
One aspect of the introduction of the Child Tax Benefit and its successor the CCTB that has
drawn particular attention is the demise of the universality of the family allowance that came
with the changes. The argument in favour of limiting access to social benefits, such as the
family allowance, is that those with greater incomes should not benefit from a program to the
same extent as those with lower incomes. High-income individuals are less in need of the
economic support provided by the social program. But some commentators have pointed out
the fallacy in this argument in the context of the demise of the universal family allowance and
its replacement by the CCTB. “[I]n reality, ending universal child benefits delivered few
benefits to very poor families, despite the fact that the reform was explicitly designed to ‘give
the greatest benefit to low and modest income families’” (Wooley et al. 1996: 37). These
consequences have led some to call for a universal component to be restored to the CCTB.61
Finally, the targeting of the CCTB may need to be reconsidered. By targeting the working
poor and not including those on social assistance to the same extent “[w]hat the government
has done is bolster the distinction between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor”
(Pulkingham and Ternowetsky 1997: 206). Consideration should be given to redressing the
inequities for those who, for reasons that may well include their responsibilities for their
children, are unable to participate fully in the paid labour force.
Conclusion
Any consideration of changes that might be made to the CCTB could look to the policy
adopted in Quebec. That province has, over the last few years, introduced a package of
programs designed to assist families with the costs associated with children. These programs
are delivered partly by tax expenditures and partly by direct grants. The measures that
comprise the program include refundable and non-refundable tax credits, heavily subsidized
child care in day care centres, including child care assistance for low-income families and the
Quebec family allowance. The latter is a non-taxable payment in respect of children under 18,
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and the amount is based on family income. It is paid monthly to the primary caregiver of the
child, who also lives with the child. The main purpose is to target children in low-income
families. In 1998, for example, over 652,000 families benefited from the Quebec family
allowance (Quebec 1999). Indeed, it is estimated that for the 1999-2000 year, over $762
million will be spent on the family allowance (Globe and Mail 1999: A1). What is most
important to note in the context of the discussion of whether the CCTB should be delivered
by the tax system is that the Government of Quebec clearly believes that there is a role to be
played by a more universal direct grant.62 Consideration should be given to reconfiguring the
CCTB so the “family allowance” part of that benefit can be delivered more directly.
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3: TAX SUBSIDIES FOR RETIREMENT SAVING
Introduction
[T]he chief problem [with Canada’s pension system] for women is that
pension schemes in both the public and private sectors were developed with
men in mind (Guest 1997: 197).
The Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women painted a bleak picture of the
financial future for women currently in the 45 to 54 age range in its report titled Women’s
Financial Futures: Mid-Life Prospects for Secure Retirement (Townson 1995). The
conclusion was that the benefits provided by the two main government pension programs—
Old Age Security (OAS) and the Canada Pension Plan/Quebec Pension Plan (CPP/QPP)—
are inadequate and, increasingly, women will have to rely on private sources of retirement
income, such as employment pension plans, registered retirement savings plans and their
personal savings.
Retirement income in Canada takes many forms and the Canadian pension system is often
described as a pyramid (Donnelly 1993: 419) with the Old Age Security, a flat-rate monthly
amount paid to those over 65 at its base, supplemented by the Guaranteed Income Supplement
(GIS). The next level is the Canada Pension Plan and the Quebec Pension Plan both of which
are intended to provide retirement income for those who have participated in the paid labour
force. Because of the inadequacies of these government “public” pensions, recourse to
“private” pensions is frequently necessary and, indeed, as I discuss later, being encouraged by
the government. At the apex of the pyramid, are the two private pension programs that are
heavily subsidized by the tax system, the registered pension plan (RPP), an employment-based
pension plan, and the registered retirement savings plan (RRSP), a personal retirement plan.
In its report, Women and Taxation, the Women and Taxation Working Group of the
Ontario Fair Tax Commission (1992: 22) said that “[t]he current system of tax-assisted
savings for retirement results in systemic discrimination against women, as the benefits are
disproportionately enjoyed by men.” The result for many women is poverty in retirement.
Elderly single women have consistently been disproportionately represented among the poor
in Canada and are twice as likely as elderly men to live in poverty (Caledon Institute 1996,
Appendix C). In 1997, almost 50 percent of single women over 65 lived below the poverty
line (Statistics Canada 1999b: 34-35), a figure that has remained consistently high over the
years.1 In this part, I explore the contribution of the tax system to this phenomenon and
suggest ways in which some of this discrimination might be eliminated. While my focus is
the tax system, particularly, the tax expenditures that are allocated toward retirement
saving, any analysis of these expenditures has to take place in the broader context of the
ongoing “reform” of the public pension system in Canada. This includes the CPP/QPP and
the OAS.
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Old Age Security and the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans
The Old Age Security is a flat rate monthly sum paid to those over 65. It is supplemented by
the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) for those whose retirement income does not meet
a minimum level. In 1989, the Conservative Government introduced a new tax which had the
effect of clawing back part of the OAS for those who had incomes above a certain level.2
This measure led to the demise of the universal nature of the OAS. By 1991, when the
clawback became fully phased in, the demise of universality was complete as some top rate
taxpayers no longer retained any of the OAS payment. In 1996, the Liberal Government
introduced front-end income testing of these benefits which means that the amount of the
OAS is reduced before the cheque is issued, a change that affected all senior citizens with net
incomes above $53,215. Further, because the income threshold for the reduced payments is
not fully indexed for inflation, the cutoff point at which one stops receiving the full amount of
the OAS is slowly decreasing in value. The OAS is an especially important pension scheme
for women who, as I demonstrate, do not benefit to the same extent as men from the more
“private” pension plans. In 1993, for example, 58 percent of all OAS recipients were women,
and that figure has been relatively unchanged over the years (CCSD nd.b).
It has been said that the CPP/QPP is an ideal pension plan for women (Townson 1995: 31). It
is designed to be an income replacement plan and benefits are based on labour force
participation. Consequently, all who work in the paid labour force, whether full or part time,
employed or self-employed, must make contributions for which they receive a tax credit.3 The
CPP/QPP also takes women’s work patterns into account by allowing women with children to
take time out of the paid labour force without a loss of benefits.4 But, there are problems with
the system. Not only are women receiving considerably less than men as CPP/QPP payments,
but fewer women than men contribute to the CPP/QPP, and the amount of their contributions
is less than the amount contributed by men. For example, in 1993 only 45 percent of
contributors to the CPP were women, and the amount of their contributions formed only 39
percent of all contributions (Statistics Canada 1996: 13). In 1994, only 45 percent of elderly
women received CPP benefits (Oderkirk 1996: 11) and, by 1996, the average CPP retirement
benefit for women was just a little over half that received by men.5 These statistics are a
reflection of the fact that women in the paid labour force tend to earn less than men and,
therefore, contribute less to the CPP/QPP. Of course, the CPP/QPP is not available to those
women who choose to work in the home and not in the paid labour force.6
Registered Pension Plans and Registered Retirement Savings Plans
Given the inadequacies of the OAS and the CPP/QPP, women are increasingly having to rely
on the “private” pension plans which include the RPP and RRSP if they are to achieve income
security in retirement. While these plans are often referred to as being “private” in nature, they
are in fact subsidized extensively by the tax system through tax breaks for both contributions
to, and income earned in, the plan, leading one author to describe them as the “third pillar” of
the public pension system (Guest 1997: 283). It is clear that increased reliance on this third
pillar is also a policy favoured and encouraged by recent federal governments. In 1989, for
example, the Minister of Finance, Michael Wilson (1989) said: “A sound tax framework is
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needed to encourage increased private saving now to meet pension needs in the future.” More
recently, the 1996 proposed reforms to the CPP are imbued with a sense that RPPs and RRSPs
are to be the cornerstone of the pension system in Canada (Canada 1996). The tax system is
also implicated in this trend. First, as mentioned, the tax system has been used to erode the
universality of the OAS with the introduction of the clawback. Second, the contribution limit
for RRSPs has increased significantly since the 1980s meaning that there is an opportunity to
contribute much more to an RRSP. The preferential tax treatment of those contributions also
gives taxpayers a significant incentive to contribute as much as possible.7 All these events have
led one author to comment: “The clear message is that individual initiative in planning for
retirement will be rewarded by the government while collective (state) responsibility for
economic well being in old age, reflected in the ‘public’ parts of the retirement income system,
cannot be permitted to grow and must be contained” (Barnsley 1998: 149).
The Tax Subsidy
Given the increasing importance of RPPs and RRSPs as a tool to provide income security for
the elderly, it is important to subject the tax rules that apply to these plans to close scrutiny to
ensure that they operate in a fair manner. The tax subsidization of RPPs and RRSPs is
extensive. Employers and employees who contribute to an RPP are permitted, subject to
limits as to amount, to deduct those amounts in the calculation of their income, and the
income earned by funds in the RPP is not taxable.8 These measures result in a significant
deferral of tax because the contribution is made with pre-tax dollars, and the resulting income
is only taxed once it is received as a pension, and not as it is earned by the pension fund. For
2000, the value of both types of preferential tax treatment is projected to be over $12 billion,
making it one of the largest personal tax expenditures for that year (Dept. of Finance 1999a,
Table 1). Contributions to RRSPs, subject to limits as to amount, are also deductible in the
computation of income and, like the RPP, the income earned by the funds accumulates within
the plan on a tax-free basis. A taxpayer is also permitted to claim a deduction (subject to
limitations as to amount) for contributions to an RRSP of which the taxpayer’s spouse is an
annuitant. As with RPPs, the value of the tax expenditure for RRSPs is significant, being
projected to be over $14 billion for the 2000 taxation year, making it the single largest tax
expenditure for that year. It is particularly striking that in 1995 (latest figures available) the
cost of tax expenditures for RPPs and RRSPs amounted to 57 percent of the total value of all
public expenditures on the OAS, GIS and CPP/QPP.9 Given the massive amount of these tax
expenditures and the increasing reliance by the elderly on RPPs and RRSPs for income
security in retirement, it is especially important to ensure that this method of subsidizing
retirement saving achieves its goals in a fair and equitable manner and that no one group is
disadvantaged in comparison to another.
Women and Registered Pension Plans
Perhaps the most significant problem that arises from subsidizing retirement saving through
the more private pension plans such as RPPs and RRSPs is that, unlike a more universal plan
such as OAS, many are excluded from entitlement. As I demonstrate, it is women in
particular who are either fully excluded from these schemes or who receive less in benefits
than men. Ascertaining exactly what percentage of women receive income from occupational
pensions to which they have contributed is difficult.10 Nevertheless, it is clear that women
44
receive less income from RPPs (either as the contributor or as a spouse of a contributor) than
men do. In 1993, 58 percent of men 65 and older received RPP income compared to 37
percent of women, and some of these women received this income as a spousal pension based
on their male spouse’s work history (Statistics Canada 1996: 30, tables 1-5 and 1-6). In
1994, elderly women received only 12 percent of their income from private retirement
pensions while for men the figure was almost 25 percent.11 While women’s membership in
RPPs has been increasing over the years,12 it still lags behind that of men. Perhaps the most
unsettling statistic is that even though the gap between the number of male and female RPP
beneficiaries has narrowed over the years, the gap between the value of those pensions has
widened. In 1982, the average pension for women was 67 percent of the average pension for
men. By 1992, the value had decreased to only 60 percent of the value of the average pension
for men (CCSD nd.c: 3).
Why are fewer women members of RPPs than men and, therefore, receiving less of the tax
subsidy than men? One major reason relates to women’s participation (or lack thereof) in the
paid labour force. For example, when tax costs, such as the loss of the spousal tax credit and
the inability to transfer unused tax credits to a spouse, are taken into account, there is a real
disincentive for women in spousal relationships to enter the paid labour force.13 Other factors
contribute to this tax disincentive, including the lack of affordable, accessible child care and
the costs of returning to the paid labour force after absences related to family responsibilities
such as retraining costs. Even though more women than ever are working outside the home,
the employment rate for women aged 25 to 54 was only 72 percent in 1998 (Statistics
Canada 1999c: 17, Chart 5). For Aboriginal women or women with disabilities, the figures
are significantly lower. The labour force participation rate for Aboriginal women is 49.7
percent and DAWN Canada (DisAbled Women’s Network) estimates that 65 percent of
women with disabilities who wish to work are unemployed (CACSW 1996: 90; CLC 1997:
5). Women who are not in the paid labour force have no access on their own account to an
RPP or the tax benefits associated with such a plan, although as I discuss, some of them may
be entitled to certain limited benefits if they have a spouse who is a member of such a plan.
The result is that these women must rely on OAS (as supplemented by GIS) and their own
savings for income in retirement which contributes to the poverty in which so many elderly
women live.
It is not only women’s lack of participation in the paid labour force that limits their ability to
benefit from tax subsidies for RPPs. The kind of work women do is also a major factor. Only
those who work for relatively large employers, economically able to provide a pension plan,
will benefit. Those who work part time, in non-unionized jobs, or for small employers unable
to finance these plans, or those who are self-employed or unemployed, do not benefit.
Women are disproportionately represented in the group unable to take advantage of the tax
benefits. For example, between 1976 and 1991 women consistently represented at least 70
percent of part-time workers (Statistics Canada 1995: 73). In 1994, women held 69 percent
of all part-time jobs and 26 percent of employed women worked part time (Statistics Canada
1998b: 9). While some women cite personal and family responsibilities as the reason for
working part time (Statistics Canada 1995: 74), over one third of women working part time
are seeking full-time work (CLC 1997: 25). Furthermore, more women than men work in
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non-unionized jobs (CLC 1997: 22), and women generally work in sectors where pension
coverage is the lowest, such as retail trade, and community, business and personal services
(Caledon Institute 1996: 22).
Another factor which contributes to women’s lack of retirement income from RPPs relative
to that of men is the fact that women change jobs more often than men (Caledon Institute
1996: 22). This mobility means that, in many instances, an employee’s contributions may not
be vested in the plan because of the short period of employment. In the past, a 10-year
contribution period was often required for vesting. While that period has been reduced in
most provinces to a two-year period, many women still leave a job without their
contributions having been vested. If the contributions have not been vested, the employee is
not able to transfer both the employer and employee contributions to another pension plan,
and entitlement to the pension is lost. There is also clear evidence that women tend to
withdraw from the paid labour force from time to time more often than men because of
family responsibilities (Caledon Institute 1996: 24). For example, women are more likely than
men to retire from the paid labour force before age 65 to take care of sick relatives (Statistics
Canada 1996: 95). These withdrawals from the paid labour force mean that women are
contributing fewer funds to pension plans than men and, therefore, are receiving smaller
pensions than their male counterparts.
Without doubt, one of the greatest obstacles for women saving for retirement is that they
earn less than men, and, therefore, contribute less to RPPs during their working lives. Thus,
women have smaller pensions on retirement. Both the amount of employer and employee
contributions to RPPs are based on a percentage of the employee’s income. Because women
earn on average 73 cents for every dollar earned by men (Statistics Canada 1999a: 27), the
amount contributed by them and their employer on their behalf to RPPs is considerably less
than that contributed by, and on behalf of, men. In 1996, for example, almost the same
number of men and women claimed a deduction for contributions to an RPP, but the amount
claimed by men was significantly more than that claimed by women.14 The problem can also
be illustrated by reference to figures that show that nearly two thirds of tax savings from the
deduction for contributions to RPPs are attributable to the 40 percent of those who claim the
deduction and who have incomes between $40,000 and $100,000 (St. Hilaire 1996: 17).
Furthermore, access to pension plans tends to increase as income increases, with only a very
small number of the lowest paid workers having access to contributory pension plans (NCW
1996: 38) and participation in RPPs being the highest for those with incomes between
$30,000 and $79,000 (Maser 1995: 14-19). These figures all lead one to believe that tax
subsidies for retirement are being enjoyed predominantly by men. There is another dimension
to this issue. Statistics show that women of colour, Aboriginal women and women with
disabilities tend to earn less than their male counterparts and than other women (Statistics
Canada 1995: 138, 153, 166). Therefore, they are in an even more invidious situation and
have less to contribute to RPPs than White able-bodied women.
Women and Registered Retirement Savings Plans
Women who do not have access to work-related pension plans may contribute to RRSPs, but
the ability to take advantage of the preferential tax treatment afforded to contributions to
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these plans depends on having funds with which to make the contribution. Given that women
earn considerably less than men, they tend to have less discretionary income to contribute to
an RRSP. This is evident when one looks at the statistics on who contributes to an RRSP and
how much they contribute. In 1996, more men than women contributed to a RRSP, and
although the disparity in the relative numbers of men (3,344,310) and women (2,655,690)
who contributed was not particularly great, there was a significant difference in the amounts
contributed. In total, men contributed over $15 billion that year while women contributed just
over half that amount, at $8.5 billion (Canada 1998b: 103). As with contributions to RPPs, it
is those in the higher income categories who contribute most to RRSPs. For example, in
1993 those with an income over $50,000 contributed, on average, approximately $6,700 to
an RRSP while those with incomes of $20,000 and less only contributed an average of
$1,662 (Canada 1998b, Table 2). The result is that women who tend to have the lower
incomes have less funds in an RRSP and, therefore, are receiving less income in retirement
from that source. In 1996, a poll conducted by Royal Trust determined that women had an
average of $25,665 in their RRSP while men had an average of $38,095 (Financial Post
1997).
While these figures demonstrate that because women tend to earn less and contribute less to
RRSPs, they are receiving less of the tax subsidy; there is a second dimension to the issue.
The 1992 figures show that only 10 percent of tax filers reporting income of $25,000 or less
contributed to an RRSP while over 72 percent of those earning over $100,000 made
contributions, and that the amount contributed by those with less income is considerably less
than that contributed by those with higher income. Using these figures, Barbara Austin
(1996: 586) has calculated that:
the average tax-filer earning over 100,000 dollars contributes forty-four times
as much to an R.R.S.P. as the average tax-filer earning under 25,000 dollars.
When the different marginal income-tax rates of these two groups are factored
in, the average benefit received by high-income earners is seventy-five times
that received by low-income earners.
Certainly, the fact that the higher one’s income, the greater the amount that may be
contributed to an RRSP disadvantages women in comparison to men because of women’s
lower incomes. Even if the contribution limits are increased for women to permit them to
contribute more to their RRSPs, there is no evidence that such a measure would result in
greater income in retirement for women. The problem is that women do not use all the RRSP
room available to them. In 1993, only 31 percent of female contributors claimed 95 percent
or more of their total room for the year (Frenken 1995: 25). Increasing that room by
increasing the amount that can be contributed is not likely to make any difference to their
ability to save for retirement through RRSPs. The main reason is that women do not have
enough discretionary income to use their full contribution room.
Women and Spousal RRSPs
Neither RPPs nor RRSPs are likely to be of any benefit to women who work inside the home
and do not participate in the paid labour force. These women do not have access to
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employment-related plans and, with no income, are unlikely to be able to contribute to an
RRSP. The tax system recognizes this problem and attempts to redress it partially by
including special rules that apply to spouses. RPPs may provide survivor benefits (either pre-
or post-retirement) which ensure that pension payments made to an individual can, on the
death of an individual, be received by the individual’s spouse. With respect to RRSPs, an
individual may, subject to amount limitations, contribute to an RRSP in the spouse’s name.
The contribution may not exceed the individual’s own contribution limit, less any amount
contributed to the individual’s own plan. The advantage of contributing to a spousal plan
(rather than one’s own plan) is that one is providing future retirement income for one’s
spouse and also splitting that income with the spouse. In other words, income that would
have accrued to the individual and been taxed in the individual’s hands on realization will be
taxed in the hands of the spouse, who may well pay tax at a lower rate than the individual
because of having less income. The general policy underlying the provision of survivor
benefits and spousal RRSPs is to permit individuals to provide for retirement income for their
spouses (primarily women) who are unable to contribute to an RPP or RRSP on their own
behalf.
At first glance, the policy appears to be laudable, but on closer examination the difficulties
become apparent. These problems led the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of
Women to lobby in the 1980s for an end to this system and for pensions for women in their
own right (Guest 1997: 197). The major problem is that state-subsidized benefits are being
provided to individuals solely on the basis that they are in a particular defined relationship
with another person. Single persons and those persons whose relationships are not
recognized by the tax system, such as lesbians,15 are discriminated against. Yet, the number of
people living in families is declining and more women than ever are living alone or with their
children (Ontario Fair Tax Commission 1993: 263). Indeed, a recent report shows a 19
percent increase in the number of adults living without a partner between 1991 and 1996
(Statistics Canada 1997a). Given these demographic changes, basing entitlement to a tax
subsidy on being in a heterosexual spousal relationship is no longer appropriate.
The Tax Deduction Issue
As with so many tax expenditures, the tax relief provided for contributions to RPPs and
RRSPs is in the form of a deduction and not a tax credit. Therefore, as discussed elsewhere in
this study, those who benefit most from the deduction are those with income taxed at the top
rate of tax. Because men tend to earn more than women and be wealthier than women, they
correspondingly receive greater subsidies. Indeed, the tax provisions relating to private
pension plans establish a hierarchy of taxpayers with respect to the tax preferences for
retirement saving which is in inverse relation to their ability to provide financially for their
retirement. At the top are those with the highest incomes (predominantly men) and below
them in declining order, are those taxpayers with lower incomes. At the bottom are those to
whom the deduction is worthless, either because they do not have access to an RPP, they do
not have funds to contribute to an RRSP, they do not have access through a spouse to a
pension plan or simply because they have insufficient taxable income to benefit from the
deduction. The tax system is merely reflecting and reinforcing the current economic
inequality between rich and poor, and between men and women.
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Options for Reform
What changes could be made to redress the problems for women that I have identified with
the current system of tax-assisted retirement saving? Clearly, the problems are not merely
flaws in the current rules that need fine-tuning. Indeed for some, the problems are so
entrenched that there appears to be no easy solution. As Susan Worth Rowley (1986: 340-
341) says:
[A]s long as pensions are based on pre-retirement income, as long as pre-
retirement income is allocated on the basis of a discriminatory wage scale, and
as long as pension plans fail to recognize the value of work that women do for
which they do not get paid—and which puts them at a further disadvantage
when they do enter the labour force, either intermittently or later in life—the
pension system will continue to be unconstitutional.
Others are more optimistic about the prospect of changes bringing about a meaningful
improvement for women, and many suggestions for improvement of the current tax rules
have been made.16
Before reviewing the possibilities, it is important to consider the policy objectives of the tax
rules respecting retirement saving. They appear to be twofold. First, the intention is to ensure
that Canadians have adequate income in retirement. Second, the rules are designed to
encourage private savings for retirement and thereby remove some of the pressure from the
state pensions such as the OAS and CPP/QPP.17 A key issue is whether, given the preceding
analysis, the tax system is the appropriate tool to use to subsidize retirement saving. Can the
gender inequalities that arise ever be remedied by changing the current tax rules, or should
subsidies for retirement saving be delivered in another manner? The answer depends, to a
certain degree, on whether one believes the current “public” pension system should be
enriched or whether the way forward is to encourage individuals to contribute to “private”
plans such as RPPs and RRSPs. If one believes the former is the best approach, then the role
of the tax system would be diminished. There is, however, no consensus on this issue. Indeed,
the Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Women and Tax Working Group (1992: 18-22), exhibited
this lack of consensus in its recommendations. Some members of the group believed that
“public subsidies for retirement savings (both RRSPs and pension plan savings) delivered
through the tax system should be redirected toward expanding and enriching the public
retirement security system (OAS, GIS and CPP/QPP)” while other members took the
position that “tax-delivered assistance to retirement savings should be maintained because
private savings for retirement are an important component of an overall retirement savings
policy.”
One reason for the lack of consensus is that political reality dictates that in the current climate
it is unlikely that more resources will be devoted to bolstering the OAS, GIS and CPP/QPP.
Indeed, given the federal government’s proposed changes to the CPP the importance of this
plan as a primary provider of income in retirement will diminish.18 As Monica Townson
(1995: 60) says:
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[B]enefits are being cut back and policies are now directed to reducing the
role of government and increasing the role of the individual in providing for
his or her own retirement. In light of this, it would appear futile to make
proposals that would increase the benefits from government programs, even
though it would be the best way to improve the financial future of women.
Given this state of affairs, and the fact that the focus of this study is the tax system, the
following suggestions for improvement address potential changes to the current tax rules that
would help remedy the gender inequities discussed above. Four alternatives are discussed:
• removal of all tax preferences for retirement saving;
• reformulation of the tax rules to reduce the amount and availability of the tax preferences
in a manner such as that recently adopted by Australia;
• placing a limit on the amount of contributions eligible for preferential tax treatment; and
• recasting the tax deduction for employees as a refundable tax credit.
Removal of All Tax Preferences
As long as there is economic inequality between men and women, which means that women
do not have the same opportunities as men to take advantage of the tax preferences for
contributions to private pensions, then an argument can be made that those particular
preferences should be removed from the Income Tax Act. Barbara Austin has suggested
elimination of the deduction for contributions to RPPs and RRSPs, while noting that if the
deduction is removed, then it would be inappropriate to tax the pension payments received on
retirement because tax would already have been paid on the portion that represents the
contributed funds. She also points out (1996: 590) that “if the income of the funds is not
taxed...the full exemption from tax of the pension benefit would result in a similar impact on
tax revenue as the current system, although the timing of the tax payments would be
advanced.” One concern with such an approach is that it would be important to track the
contributions to the plan in order to tax only the portion of the pension payment that
represents accrued income.
The idea of taxing the investment income generated by RPPs and RRSPs has not received
much attention. In my view, there are severe difficulties with such a course of action. First, it
would be necessary to determine in whose hands the investment income would be taxed.
Would it be attributed, and taxed to, the contributor? If so, there may well be a problem with
liquidity; that is, the contributor may not have sufficient funds to pay the taxes because of not
being in receipt of the income at the time the tax liability arose. This problem would be
especially acute for those with lower incomes and, although there are several provisions in
the Act that tax income even though it has not been received, such a change is likely to be
highly unpopular. An alternative would be to have the tax paid by the pension fund, although
as Austin (1996: 592) points out it would be “impossible to apply a single tax rate to
retirement funds without either maintaining the increased tax benefits to high-income earners
or penalizing low-income earners for participating.” For these reasons, taxing the investment
income earned by RPPs and RRSPs is not an attractive proposal.
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Reduce the Amount and Availability of Tax Preferences
A less drastic measure is to reduce, rather than eliminate, the tax preferences for investment in
pension plans. This approach has been taken in several countries. New Zealand, for example,
has recently removed the deduction for contributions to superannuation (pension) schemes and
commenced to tax all pension fund income, although pension income taken on retirement
remains untaxed. This measure was taken, in part, to improve the equity of the tax system
(Dilnot 1992: 63). In Australia, the emphasis has been on getting more employers to provide
pension plans for their employees. The Superannuation Guarantee Charge Act, 1992 requires
employers to make contributions to a superannuation plan for each employee earning more
than $900 a month. Tax relief is given by way of a deduction to employers for their
contributions, a low rate of tax (15 percent) on earnings in the plan and a 15 percent tax rebate
(credit) for income received from the plan by superannuated employees. From a tax
perspective, the advantage of this approach is that the value of the tax subsidy for individual
taxpayers, who are members of the plan, does not depend on their marginal tax rate because
the tax deduction is only available to the employer, and the tax advantage to the retired
employee is in the form of a credit, which is worth the same in terms of tax dollars saved to all
taxpayers.
Limit the Amount of the Deduction for Contributions to RPPs and RRSPs
Another approach that would reduce some of the current gender inequities would be to limit
the deductible amount of contributions to RPPs and RRSPs. This suggestion was the one
most often made to the Finance Committee in its 1994 pre-budget consultations (Austin
1996: 588). Currently, the upper limit for these deductions is based on earnings at two and a
half times the average wage of all workers which is three and a half times the earnings of a
typical woman worker (Townson 1995: 63). The issue of how much should be deductible has
been the topic of some debate. For example, in 1990 The National Council of Welfare (1990:
84) recommended that the limit on contributions to RPPs be no more than one and one-half
times the average wage. This proposal was reiterated by the Ontario Fair Tax Commission
(1993: 885) in 1993 and by the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women which
extended it to apply to all contributions to both RPPs and RRSPs in the same year (Townson
1995: 64). One problem with this approach is that even though it would limit the amount of
the tax subsidy available for the high-income earner, it would do nothing to deal with the
problem of the low-income earner who has no funds to contribute to a pension plan. If such a
measure were to be adopted, it would be extremely important to ensure that the tax windfall
to the government was applied to reduce some of the consequences of the historical
inequities for women arising from the current system by, for example, redirecting the funds to
improving the OAS. There is no doubt that any plan to reduce the amount that may be
contributed to an RPP or RRSP would prompt a very negative reaction from many quarters.
One only has to glance through the pages of financial newspapers before a budget, when the
issue of the limitations on the contributory amounts arises, to see how significant the
opposition is to such a proposal.
Convert the Deduction to a Refundable Tax Credit
An alternative approach, suggested by several commentators, is to replace the deduction for
contributions to private pension plans with a tax credit.19 The attraction of this proposal is
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that it would increase the progressivity of the system because the tax credit would be worth
the same to all taxpayers in terms of tax dollars saved, regardless of the rate at which they
pay tax.20 Such a credit could be made refundable which would ensure that many of those,
with no access to the tax subsidies for retirement saving because they have no taxable
income, would benefit. This proposal, however, does not address the problems of those with
no funds to contribute in the first place.
Conclusion
The tax system plays a significant role in subsidizing retirement saving, and it appears likely
that it will continue to do so. While implementation of any of the changes described above
would go some way to remedying the inequitable application of the tax rules to women, none
would be a complete solution. Nevertheless, as Monica Townson (1995: 60) has said:
Benefits are being cut back and policies are now directed to reducing the role
of government and increasing the role of the individual in providing for her or
his own retirement. In light of this, it would appear futile to make proposals
that would increase the benefits from government programs, even though that
would be the best way to improve the financial future of women.
Political reality appears to dictate that the most likely improvement that can be accomplished
with respect to improving the economic security of women in retirement is to increase
women’s access to tax-subsidized pension plans.
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  For two excellent discussions of the issue of extending the CPP/QPP to homemakers, see
Guest (1997: 205-207) and Cassels (1995: 173).
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7
  For a discussion of this issue, see Barnsley (1998).
8
  Sections 147.2(1) and (2) and section 149(1)(o.1) of the Income Tax Act.
9
  For 1995, the value of all tax expenditures was over $24 billion and the value of all public
expenditures on OAS, GIS, CPP/QPP and QPP was over $42 billion. See Canada, (1998: 14-
15); and CCSD (nd.a: 2).
10
 There are several problems in identifying this source of income. First, the taxation statistics
do not tell us whether the RPP income of an individual is an individual pension or whether it
is a spousal benefit. In the case of the latter, the contributions would not have been made by
the recipient but rather by the spouse of the recipient. Second, RPP income includes income
from deferred profit sharing plans, registered retirement income funds, foreign pensions and
survivor benefits. Third, income from RRSPs cannot be specifically identified because annuity
income from RRSPs is included with investment income and registered retirement income
funds.
11
 Statistics Canada 1997: 108. One reason that women are currently receiving less retirement
income from RPPs is that women were often not allowed to join occupational pension plans
until they reached a certain age, and that age was a later one than the one set for men. For an
analysis of this problem, see Townson (1995: 44) While such practices are not permitted any
longer because they offend human rights legislation, there are undoubtedly many women yet
to retire who were adversely affected by these practices. From a tax perspective, these
women had no access to a significant tax subsidy. That fact, combined with the prohibition on
their ability to contribute to a pension plan for all or part of the time they spent in the paid
labour force, means they will continue to be less well off than their retired male counterparts
in the future.
12
  In 1985, women accounted for 35 percent of all RPP members; by 1995, that figure had
risen to 44 percent (Statistics Canada 1998: 25).
13
  For a full discussion of this issue, see Young (1997).
14
  In 1996, 1.8 million men deducted just under $4 billion while 1.74 million women
deducted just under $3 billion. See Canada (1998: 103). These figures do not take into
account those individuals who were not able to claim the tax deduction because they had no
taxable income. It is likely that more women fall into that category given that they tend to
earn less than men and have less access to the labour market.
15
  It should be noted that as of the date of preparation of this study, section 252(4) of the
Income Tax Act defines a spouse as a person of the opposite sex who cohabits with the
taxpayer in a conjugal relationship and has so cohabited with the taxpayer for 12 months, or
is the parent of a child of whom the taxpayer is also a parent and has cohabited with that
person for 12 months.  Therefore, the partners of gay men and lesbians are not included as
spouses in this definition. In Rosenberg v. Canada (Attorney-General) 98 D.T.C. 6286 at
6293, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the words “or the same sex” should be read into
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the definition of spouse in section 252(4) as it applies to the registration of RPPs, with the
result that lesbians and gay men now have “spouses” for the purposes of registration of
RPPs. The ruling did not extend to RRSPs, although there is some indication that the federal
government is considering changes to the definition of spouse for all purposes of the Income
Tax Act.
16
  See, for example, Austin (1996: 588-594); Dulude (1981: 41-90); NCW (1990); Townson
(1995: 61-66) and Ontario Fair Tax Commission (1992: 21-22).
17
  See, for example, Austin (1996: 577). It is important to note that there is a strong critique
of the privatization of retirement saving. By abandoning universality in its pension program
and making the system more private, the state is benefiting those who have higher incomes
and are, therefore, in the best economic position to save for retirement at the expense of
those who are less well off. These criticisms have led some to argue that this trend toward
privatization of retirement saving should be abandoned and that there should be a move
toward a more universal public pension system with less reliance on the private sector. See,
for example, Austin (1996: 587); Dulude (1981: 41); NCW (1990: 22) and the Ontario Fair
Tax Commission (1992: 21).
18
  For a discussion of this issue, see Guest (1997: 286).
19
  See, for example, Austin (1996: 591); Donnelly (1993: 447); NCW (1990: 84); Ontario
Fair Tax Commission (1993: 332) and Townson (1995: 64).
20
  One critique of this proposal in the context of RRSPs is that a tax credit is generally given
at the lowest federal rate and, if that were done in this case, in order to be fair, the tax
imposed on funds when withdrawn would also have to be at the lowest rate which would give
a benefit to those with higher incomes. If the tax on withdrawal were at a higher rate, then
some of the incentive to contribute to an RRSP would disappear because the tax paid on
withdrawal would be higher than the tax credit for contributions. Nevertheless, I suggest that
the benefit of the sheltering of income from tax while it was in the RRSP would continue to
attract investment in RRSPs.
4:  OTHER TAX SUBSIDIES
Tax Subsidies Related to Dependence
Dependency provisions should be eliminated. These provisions undermine the
important contribution that women working in the home make to the
economy. Equally important, they raise the costs of entering the workforce,
thereby distorting their choices and undermining their autonomy (Maloney
1994: 146).
The focus in this part is on the impact on women of two particular provisions that relate to
dependency: the spousal (marital) tax credit1 and the ability to transfer unused tax credits to a
spouse.2 Both measures have been the subject of much criticism when viewed from the
perspective of their impact on women.3
Spousal Tax Credit and the Transfer of Unused Tax Credits to a Spouse
The forerunner of the spousal tax credit was the marital exemption, introduced in the original
Income War Tax Act in 1917. The exemption was available to married taxpayers and
provided an exemption from tax of $3,000, in contrast to the personal tax exemption of
$1,500. As Kathleen Lahey (1988: 378) has pointed out, “the personal and spousal
exemptions had an important political and economic function: they effectively exempted
working class men, single or married, from income taxation.” In 1942, the marital exemption
was revised to provide that even if a woman entered the paid labour force her husband was
still entitled to the exemption, although in 1947 a limit ($250) was put on the amount a
married woman could earn before her husband lost entitlement to the exemption.4 In 1988,
the marital exemption was converted to a tax credit, and effective January 1, 1992 it was
extended to include persons living in common-law relationships.5 For the 1999 tax year, the
spousal amount is $5,718. This amount is reduced by the excess of the spouse’s net income
over $538. This reduction has the effect of eliminating entitlement to the credit when the
spouse’s income exceeds $5,918, meaning that if a spouse works in the paid labour force,
entitlement to the credit is lost very quickly. Related to the spousal credit is the rule that an
individual who is unable to use certain tax credits may transfer them to the spouse who may
then apply them to reduce tax payable. Credits eligible for this transfer include the tuition tax
credit, education tax credit, age credit, pension credit and disability tax credit.
There is a gendered impact to these rules. More women than men work in the home and not
in the paid labour force; therefore, it is men who predominantly claim the spousal tax credit.6
Furthermore, more than four times as many men use tax credits transferred from their spouse
than women (Canada 1998b). Several issues arise when one considers the impact on women
of provisions such as the spousal tax credit and the transfer of unused credits. The first issue
is that provisions based on dependency are a disincentive to women’s participation in the paid
labour force. The theory is that when the tax costs (in this case the loss of the spousal credit
and the inability to transfer unused credits to a spouse) are taken into account, there is a real
disincentive to women in spousal relationships entering the paid labour force. This
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disincentive is exacerbated by other costs, such as child care, travel, clothing and the
monetary and non-monetary costs associated with replacing the household labour.
Furthermore, when one considers that many women are the secondary earners in their
heterosexual relationships,7 and that they work for relatively low wages, the combination of
these factors and the tax disincentives have a particularly detrimental effect on women’s
choice to work outside the home.
Despite the disincentives to women’s participation in the paid labour force, more women than
ever are working outside the home.8 The main reason appears to be economic necessity.9
Women are not, however, earning what men are and they are more likely to be engaged in
casual or part-time work. This often means they continue to be the secondary earners in their
relationships. In 1995, for example, the average total income for all Canadian women over 15
was roughly $16,600 while the corresponding figure for men was $29,600 (Status of Women
1997: 13). Therefore, any added penalty to women’s participation in the paid labour force is
unacceptable.
Another important critique of dependency provisions is that rules, such as the spousal tax
credit, affirm that a woman’s dependency on man deserves tax relief. Again, this undermines
the autonomy of women and results in a certain privatization of economic responsibility for
dependent persons. Tax policy has responded to women’s lack of economic power by leaving
it to the family (the private sector) to assume responsibility for women’s lack of resources.
Furthermore, in the case of the spousal tax credit, the tax subsidy is delivered to the
economically dominant person in the relationship and not the “dependent” person who needs
it. The manner of delivery assumes that income is pooled and wealth distributed equally
within the relationship. However, studies show that this assumption is simply false. In reality,
such pooling and redistribution of wealth does not occur in the majority of relationships.10
Many women do not have access to, or control over, income earned by their spouse.
Predicating tax policies on the assumption that they do is unfair.
There is also clear evidence that the living arrangements of taxpayers have changed
considerably since the introduction of provisions such as the spousal tax credit. The number of
people living in traditional nuclear families is declining, more women than ever are living alone
or with their children, and the vast majority of lone-parent families are headed by women.
Indeed, lone-parent families headed by women outnumber those headed by men by more than
four to one (Statistics Canada 1997a: 2). As the Working Group of the Ontario Fair Tax
Commission (1992: 9) says, “the concept of a couple as a life-long economic unit with joint
income, wealth, and expenses may no longer be appropriate given changing family structures,
increasing divorce rates, and falling marriage rates.”
Section 252(4) of the Income Tax Act provides that a spouse of a taxpayer includes the
person of the opposite sex who cohabits with the taxpayer in a conjugal relationship and:
• has so cohabited with the taxpayer for 12 months; or
• is the parent of a child of whom the taxpayer is also a parent.
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The definition of spouse does not include the partners of lesbians or gay men and, therefore, a
lesbian is not entitled to the spousal tax credit in respect of her partner. As I have discussed
above, the spousal tax credit has some negative implications for women, but if it is to remain
in the Income Tax Act, it should, at the very least, be amended to include same-sex
relationships. Indeed, it may well be that the current definition contravenes section 15(1) of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms because it discriminates on the basis of sexual
orientation. In Rosenberg v. Canada (Attorney-General),11 the Ontario Court of Appeal held
that the words “or same-sex” should be read into the definition of “spouse” in the Income
Tax Act as it applies to the registration of registered pension plans, with the result that
lesbians and gay men are now spouses for  the purposes of registration of those occupational
pension plans. In Rosenberg, the Attorney-General conceded that the definition of spouse as
it applied to pension plans contravened section 15(1) of the Charter. 12 It is difficult to see
why the definition would contravene section 15(1) only in the context of its application to
pension plans. Therefore, it is likely that the definition is discriminatory within the meaning of
section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The issue would then be
whether that discrimination can be justified in accordance with section 1 of the Charter,
thereby saving the definition. The issue may be resolved soon. The Foundation for Equal
Families, a lesbian and gay activist group, has begun legal action against the federal
government on this issue. The argument is that the term “spouse” in 58 pieces of legislation,
including the Income Tax Act, discriminates against lesbians and gay men contrary to section
15(1) of the Charter because it applies only to persons of the opposite sex and it cannot be
saved by section 1.13
Options for Reform
What measures might redress the problems discussed above? A first step would be to
reconsider the general issue of providing tax subsidies to those in spousal relationships. For
example, in the United States, economist Julie Nelson (1996: 108) suggests that spousal
status should not be the determinant of which relationships are relevant for the purposes of
tax subsidies such as the spousal tax credit. She suggests the term should be expanded to
include “individuals-in-relation” which would include the taxpayer and his or her dependant.
A dependant would include a person unable to support himself or herself and the connection
to the individual may or may not be a familiar one. The individual would claim the tax credit
in respect of support of the dependant. While this suggestion would factor in different kinds
of living relationships and thereby eliminate the current discrimination against lesbians and
gay men who are not defined as spouses in the Income Tax Act, it would not address directly
the problems of the disincentive to women’s participation in the paid labour force, nor the
fact that the subsidy is delivered to the economically dominant person in the relationship.
More radical change is required.
The Ontario Fair Tax Commission struggled with this issue. The Women and Tax Working
Group was split in the approach to be taken. Some members recommended that the spousal
tax credit and the rules respecting the transfer of unused credits be repealed (Ontario Fair
Tax Commission 1992: 111). In its final report, the Commission (1993: 271) recommended:
“Ideally the marital credit should be removed at both the federal and provincial level” and the
surplus funds redirected through a reformed credit process. This approach is one that, as the
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quotation at the start of this chapter indicates, is also favoured by Maureen Maloney (1994).
Those members of the Women and Tax Working Group who did not favour repeal of these
provisions argued for the conversion of the spousal credit to a refundable tax credit that
should be delivered to the spouse with the lower income. Such a measure would ensure that
the economically dependent person in the relationship received the subsidy.
Conclusion
Whether to retain the spousal tax credit and the ability to transfer unused tax credits to a
spouse is a difficult issue. As part of its Strategic Agenda, the Law Commission of Canada is
soliciting input on the issue of personal relationships and the law.14 Part of the work will
involve examining issues such as redefining the terms of those relationships that should be of
legal importance and, in this context, whether or not a tax system can be designed without
reference to spouses and family units.15 Given the broad scope of this project and its specific
reference to tax law, it would make sense to wait for the conclusion of the work and the
report of the Law Commission before making any changes to the Act.
Tax Subsidies for Those with Disabilities or in Respect of Individuals Being Cared for
by Relatives
Despite the extensive assistance available to the disabled, it is likely that many
eligible individuals are not taking advantage of all the tax benefits available to
them. One reason is the breadth and complexity of the rules. Most individuals,
and even tax professionals, would find it difficult to unravel the network of
legislation relating to credits and deductions for the disabled, as well as the
eligibility criteria applicable to each case (Katz 1999: 690).
The tax system is increasingly being used to provide relief for those with physical or mental
disabilities and those who care for persons with disabilities. Several measures have been
included in the Income Tax Act and the purpose of the rules is to “‘level the playing field’ for
people with disabilities who have earned income (not necessarily from employment) by
allowing them to claim tax recognition of a proportion of their disability-related costs”
(Library of Parliament 1997: 8). More recently, there has been a recognition that tax relief for
disability is about more than merely horizontal equity. It has been said: “Disability-related tax
assistance has been used to influence behaviour, to encourage employment, to promote
community living as an alternative to institutional care, and to compensate people with
disabilities for non-pecuniary hardships imposed by their disabilities” (Ontario Fair Tax
Commission 1993: 313). The amount spent on tax measures related to disability and infirmity
has increased significantly over the years. For example the cost of the disability tax credit has
increased from $150 million in 1989 to a projected cost of $280 million in 2000 (Canada
1993; Dept. of Finance 1999a, Table 1). For 2000, it is anticipated that the infirm dependant
tax credit will cost $7 million and the new caregiver tax credit $125 million (Dept. of Finance
1999a). Given these factors, it is important to evaluate how effective and fair the tax rules
are.
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The Tax Rules
Tax relief with respect to disability is provided by way of the disability tax credit,16 the infirm
dependant tax credit17 and the caregiver tax credit.18 Furthermore, the cost of attendant care
may be a qualifying medical expense and, therefore, eligible for the medical expense tax
credit19 or it may qualify for the attendant care deduction.20 The cost of institutional care for
an individual may also qualify for the medical expense tax credit. The 1999 budget proposes
that care in a group home be added to the list of eligible expenses for the purposes of that tax
credit (Dept. of Finance 1999c, Resolution 14). Quebec also provides an additional
refundable tax credit, the ascendant lodging tax credit.21 While tax relief is provided through
these measures, it should be noted that recipients of disability pension payments from the
CPP/QPP are required to include those amounts in income.22
Disability Tax Credit
The specific rules relating to tax assistance for those with disabilities are, as the quotation at the
beginning of this section indicates, extremely complex. Consequently, the following discussion
does not cover all the details but provides enough information for the reader to determine how
the rules operate in a general sense.23 The disability tax credit is approximately $1,080 in
amount. To qualify for the credit, an individual must have a severe and prolonged physical or
mental disability, and the ability to perform the basic activities of daily living must be markedly
restricted. A medical doctor or other specified health professional must certify that the individual
meets this description, and the individual cannot have claimed remuneration for an attendant or
care in a nursing home as a medical expense. The limited application of the credit is evident
when one considers that significantly more individuals describe themselves as having a disability
in Canada than claim the tax credit. For example, in 1991 (latest figures available), 4.2 million
Canadians identified themselves as having a disability (Library of Parliament 1997) but, in 1996,
only 462,830 individuals claimed the credit (Canada 1998b: 72). If an individual with a disability
has little or no income and is, therefore, not in a position to use the non-refundable credit to
offset taxes, the unused portion may be transferred to a supporting person such as a spouse,
parent, grandparent, child or grandchild.24 A transfer to a spouse is not permitted if the spouse
has claimed either the spousal tax credit or a transfer of other unused credits in respect of the
individual with the disability, or if another person has claimed the individual with the disability as
a dependant.
Infirm Dependant Tax Credit
The infirm dependant tax credit may be claimed in respect of relatives over the age of 17 who
are dependent on the taxpayer for support because of mental or physical infirmity. In order to
be an eligible dependant, the individual with the disability must be a child, grandchild, parent,
grandparent, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, niece or nephew of the claimant. The maximum
amount of the credit for 1999 is $400; it is decreased if the dependant has income over $4,103,
disappearing completely once the income of the individual with the disability reaches $6,456.
Caregiver Tax Credit
The caregiver tax credit was introduced in the 1998 budget.25 It provides a credit to
caregivers who maintain a self-contained domestic establishment that is the ordinary place of
residence for the caregiver and the care recipient. The care recipient must be the child,
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grandchild, parent, grandparent, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, nephew or niece of the caregiver.
The credit is not available if the caregiver claims the equivalent to spousal tax credit, and the
value of the credit is zero if the caregiver’s income exceeds $13,853. Quebec provides a
refundable tax credit—the ascendant lodging tax credit—intended to assist those who have
elderly relatives living with them. The credit is $550 and is available to an adult taxpayer who
lives with a parent, grandparent or great-grandparent aged 70 or older (or aged 60 or over if
the elderly relative suffers from a prolonged severe mental or physical disability). What is
interesting about this credit is that there is no requirement that the ascendant be financially
dependent on the taxpayer, although the measure is clearly aimed at helping those who
support elderly relatives.
Attendant Care
The cost of attendant care for a qualifying individual may either be treated as a qualifying
medical expense for the purpose of the medical expense credit or taken as a deduction in the
computation of income. A qualifying individual is someone who meets the conditions
imposed with respect to eligibility for the disability tax credit. In the case of an individual who
does not qualify in this manner, there is a provision that permits the cost of attendant care in
the individual’s home to be claimed as a medical expense for the purposes of the medical
expense tax credit if the individual is mentally or physically infirm.26 To qualify for the
attendant care deduction, an individual with a disability must be eligible for the disability tax
credit and must require the attendant care to work, The attendant care may not be provided
by a spouse. There is a maximum on the amount that may be claimed. It is the lesser of the
amounts paid to enable the individual to be employed, carry on business, or do research or
similar work for which a grant was received and two thirds of the total amount included in
income from those sources.
How do the rules discussed above affect women compared to men? There are three distinct
forms of tax relief provided with respect to disability. First, there are measures that result in
tax relief given directly to an individual with a disability, such as the disability tax credit and
the attendant care deduction. Second, some measures direct tax relief to the caregiver, such
as the infirm dependant tax credit, the caregiver tax credit and the Quebec ascendant lodging
refundable tax credit. Finally, there is the ability to transfer any unused portion of the
disability tax credit to a relative.
Tax relief provided directly to those with disabilities
Once again, women’s lack of income and wealth relative to men affects their entitlement to
these tax expenditures. The relief for the attendant care is provided by way of a tax
deduction. This manner of provision means that, because the value of the deduction is tied to
the rate at which an individual pays tax, those with higher incomes receive a greater share of
the tax subsidy than those with lower incomes. As discussed elsewhere in this study, women
are more likely to be in the latter group. In 1991, for example, one quarter of all women with
disabilities lived below the poverty line while the figure for men with disabilities was only 18
percent (Fawcett 1996: 131). The problem with the disability tax credit is that because it is
non-refundable, it is only of value to those individuals with taxable income. While the
purpose of the credit is to allow persons with disabilities to defray some of the costs related
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to their disability, that relief is not available to a considerable number of those who need this
assistance. Persons with disabilities have incomes that are considerably lower than the
incomes of non-disabled individuals. In 1991 for example, 43 percent of individuals with
disabilities earned less than $10,000, and 26 percent earned less than $5,000 (Library of
Parliament 1997: 2). For these individuals the disability tax credit is worthless.
Tax relief provided to caregivers
Increasingly, women are becoming caregivers for persons other than just their children. Many
women care for elderly relatives in the home or family members with a disability. As the
Women and Taxation Working Group of the Ontario Fair Tax Commission (1993: 41) noted,
“for the most part, care is provided by wives, daughters and daughters-in-law.” Frequently,
the provision of this kind of care precludes these women from working outside the home in
the paid labour force or, if they do work outside the home, it may be part time in order to
ensure they have enough time for their caregiving duties. More women than men work part
time,27 and more than five times as many women over the age of 55 as men cite “family
responsibilities” as the reason for working part time (Statistics Canada 1998a: 13, Table 2).
Given the age of these women, it is most likely that those responsibilities include the care of
relatives other than children. Furthermore, women’s role as the caregiver in the family,
including their responsibility for elderly relatives was given as a reason for 62 percent of
interruptions in women’s paid work (Statistics Canada 1997c: 4).
While the infirm dependant tax credit and the caregiver tax credit do go some way to
recognizing the costs associated with caring for relatives, problems remain. These problems
have a disproportionately negative impact on women who, as discussed above, tend to be the
caregivers for the elderly and those persons with disabilities. First, the amount of the tax
credits is low and does not reflect the cost to the caregiver of providing the care in the home.
Second, these federal credits are of no value to a supporting person with no tax payable, to
which they can be applied, because they are not refundable tax credits. Therefore, for
example, a single woman who is caring for her elderly mother and has little or no income
because she cannot work outside the home will receive no tax subsidy in respect of that care.
Third, the new caregiver tax credit discourages the person being cared for from attempting to
earn income outside the home, where possible, because entitlement to the credit diminishes so
quickly.
Tax relief provided in the form of a transfer of the unused portion of the disability tax
credit
While the ability to transfer any unused disability tax credit to a spouse appears to be a
positive measure, it only applies to heterosexual couples and thereby discriminates against
lesbians and gay men.
Options for Reform
Disability tax credit
An obvious measure that would bring some relief from the problems outlined above is to
convert the disability tax credit to a refundable tax credit. There are several benefits to such a
change. First, all persons entitled to the disability tax credit would receive it, regardless of
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their level of income. Those who do not receive the subsidy because they have no taxable
income would now be entitled to the tax credit. Another advantage is that there would be no
need for the rule that allows any unused portion of the disability tax credit to be transferred
to a spouse. The refundable tax credit would go to the person who needs it—the individual
with the disability—and not the spouse. The current rule that permits the transfer of the credit
to a spouse gives the tax subsidy to the economically dominant person in the relationship.
This measure increases the economic dependence of individuals with a disability on the
spouse and deprives them of what could be a small source of income. Making the tax credit
refundable would alleviate this problem and direct the subsidy to those who need it most.
It is interesting to note that while the Ontario Fair Tax Commission (1993: 314-318) received
many representations from groups favouring the conversion of the disability tax credit to a
refundable tax credit, it chose not to make such a recommendation. One reason is that if the
credit was made refundable, it would not necessarily result in a benefit to those persons on
social assistance with disabilities, because their social assistance payments might be reduced
because of the increased income. Therefore, the Ontario Fair Tax Commission (1993: 318)
recommended that the disability tax credit be removed from the Income Tax Act and replaced
with a flat rate, taxable benefit payable to all persons with disabilities.
If the subsidy for those with disabilities continues to be delivered by the tax system and is not
converted to a refundable tax credit, then the discriminatory impact on lesbians (and gay
men) should be remedied. As discussed above, the ability to transfer the unused portion of
the disability tax credit is only available to individuals in heterosexual relationships. The
definition of spouse in the Income Tax Act should be amended to include same-sex couples.
The caregiver tax credit
While the introduction of the caregiver tax credit is a very important move toward
recognizing and valuing women’s caregiving work in the home, improvements could be made
to redress some of the problems discussed above. The National Association of Women and
the Law has recommended several changes: the caregiver tax credit be delivered to the
“primary caregiver” and a rebuttable presumption that the primary caregiver is a woman.28
Such a change would merely recognize that caregiving work is performed primarily by
women. This recommendation is not as unusual as it may seem given that the Income Tax Act
already includes a rebuttable presumption that, for the purposes of the Canada Child Tax
Benefit, the female parent is the person who primarily fulfils the responsibility for the care
and upbringing of the child and, therefore, receives the benefit. Including such a presumption,
whether it relates to the role of women as the primary caregivers for children or as the
primary caregivers for the elderly and others, merely acknowledges the sociological evidence
that many more women than men fulfil caregiving roles.
A further change that would improve access by women to the caregiver tax credit would be
to convert the credit to a refundable credit so those with no taxable income would benefit
from the subsidy. Such a move would parallel Quebec’s approach to the provision of tax
relief for those needing care because the ascendant lodging tax credit is fully refundable.
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The Ontario Fair Tax Commission (1993: 321) also recommended that the attendant care
deduction and the tax credit for disability-related medical expenses be eliminated and replaced
with a direct spending program designed to subsidize these costs. These recommendations
highlight the issue of whether the tax system should be used to deliver subsidies in respect of
disability or whether a more direct approach would ensure that the policy objectives of the
tax measures are accomplished in a more equitable manner.
Conclusion
A fundamental issue underlying the provision of subsidies to individuals with disabilities and
those who care for them is whether the tax system is the appropriate tool for delivering these
subsidies. While much of the debate to date has focussed on improvements that might be
made to the tax rules, such as making the credits refundable, the Ontario Fair Tax
Commission (1993: 1) rejected such an approach. Not only did it recommend replacement of
the disability tax credit with a direct grant, it also recommended elimination of the attendant
care deduction and the tax credit for disability-related medical expenses, and their
replacement with a new program outside the tax system.
Why is the tax system viewed as such an inappropriate tool for delivering these particular
subsidies? The answer is a combination of factors including the concern that any
improvement to the tax rules intended to increase access to the subsidy might affect
entitlement to social assistance. Another difficulty with using the tax system is that the tax
rules respecting disability and caregiving are exceedingly complex, and there is no indication
that there is any intent on the part of the government to make them more simple and user
friendly. There is also concern that any program intended to alleviate some of the problems
for those with disabilities should be highly visible—something not achieved when the rules
are “hidden” in the tax legislation. In a similar vein, one might ask whether the Canada
Customs and Revenue Agency is the appropriate vehicle for administering a program
intended to improve the welfare of individuals with disabilities. Perhaps, the expertise is to be
found elsewhere. All these factors raise the issue of whether the tax rules can ever be
reworked to accomplish their goals in a fair manner.
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11
 98 D.T.C. 6286.
12
  The decision in Rosenberg turned on whether or not the discrimination in contravention of
section  15(1) of the Charter was “saved” by section 1 of the Charter.  Section 1 reads as
follows:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
13
  See Foundation for Equal Families (1999). It should be noted that redefining “spouse” to
include same-sex couples presents problems. As I have discussed in other work, one
consequence will be that couples in which both partners have low incomes stand to pay more
tax. This problem arises because of loss of entitlement to the full GST tax credit and the
Canada Child Tax Benefit because those tax credits are calculated on “family” income. See
Young (1994: 535) for a full discussion of the class implications of including lesbians and gay
men in the definition of spouse.
14
  Law Commission of Canada <http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/contracts>.
15
 The Law Commission of Canada is funding two projects considering the issue of “spousal
status” and the Income Tax Act. One project entitled “What’s Sex Got To Do With It? Tax
and the Family” is being prepared by the author, and Professor Kathleen Lahey, Professor of
Law at Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario is completing a project entitled “The Role of
the State: Adult Relationships and the Tax/Benefit Unit.” Publication date for both projects is
2000.
16
  Section 118.3(1) of the Income Tax Act.
17
  Section 118(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act.
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18
  Section 118(1)(c.1) of the Income Tax Act.
19
  Section 118.2(2)(b), (b.1) and (c) of the Income Tax Act.
20
  Section 64 of the Income Tax Act.
21
  Sections 1029.8.54 to 1029.8.61 of the Taxation Act R.S.Q., c. I-3.
22
  Section 56(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act.
23
  For a detailed analysis of the operation of the tax rules in respect of disability see Katz
(1999).
24
  Sections 118.8 and 118.3(2) of the Income Tax Act.
25
  Section 118(1)(c.1) of the Income Tax Act.  While this section was introduced in 1998, it
has not yet been enacted.
26
  Section 118.2(2) of the Income Tax Act.
27
  Almost 70 percent of part-time workers are women and 26 percent of employed women
work part time. See Statistics Canada (1998b).
28
  This proposal means that while the primary caregiver will be presumed to be a woman, if
there are circumstances where it is clear that this is not factually true then the presumption
can be rebutted (NAWL 1998: 17).
5:  CONCLUSION
This study has focussed on the impact on women of funding social programs through the tax
system. It has recognized that the tax system is not just a revenue-raising program, but over
the years, it has become a most powerful social and economic tool, one that is increasingly
implicated in the delivery of social programs. Consequently, the underlying theoretical
framework of this study is tax expenditure analysis. The study also places the analysis in the
context of the social and economic realities of women’s lives. In so doing, the study
recognizes that women are not a monolithic group, and their experience is affected by
differences among them which are the consequence of social conditions such, as race, age,
sexual orientation, class and disability. While recognizing the value of traditional tools of tax
policy analysis in evaluating tax measures, this study uses equality among particular groups in
society as the foundation of its analysis. An equality analysis is applied to those tax measures
that are used to deliver social programs. The intention is to determine how those measures
apply to women. Do women benefit to the same extent as men? How does women’s socio-
economic status affect their access and entitlement to tax subsidies?
The focus of this study is tax subsidies related to children, dependence, retirement saving and
those for individuals with disabilities and their caregivers. These tax provisions were the focus
of the study because the subsidies they deliver are of fundamental importance to women. As
has been discussed, the current tax rules are replete with problems for women. Some of those
problems include women’s lack of access to the tax subsidies and the inadequate amount of the
subsidies.
The fundamental question underlying the options for reform that conclude each chapter is
whether the tax system should be used at all as a tool to deliver the particular subsidy. By
highlighting the problems with the various rules, the intention is to allow the reader to
consider that question, although it is beyond the scope of the study to make a definitive
recommendation on that issue. The main focus in the options for reform, however, is
consideration of those changes to the tax rules that would redress the inequities discussed in
relation to the particular tax subsidies. These changes are put forward to stimulate discussion
on the issues.
The child care expense deduction and the Canada Child Tax Benefit are discussed in detail.
Given that women are the primary caregivers for children, these subsidies have a very
important role to play for women. The conclusion is that both these subsidies have problems.
For example, the child care expense deduction is inadequate in amount and is worth more in
terms of tax dollars saved to those with high incomes than to those with lower incomes. The
limitations with respect to the definition of income to which the deduction can be applied
have a negative effect on many women. In the case of the Canada Child Tax Benefit, this
measure is targeted in a manner that disadvantages those women on social assistance in
comparison to the working poor. Suggested options for reform to the child care expense
include increasing the amount of the deduction, removing restrictions on the nature of the
income to which the deduction may be applied or converting the deduction to a refundable
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tax credit (as is done in Quebec). The key issue for consideration with respect to the Canada
Child Tax Benefit is whether the tax system is the appropriate tool for delivering this
program.
The tax system plays a significant role in subsidizing retirement saving; yet women, for a
variety of reasons, do not have as much access to these subsidies as men. One reason is that
the tax subsidies are provided for contributions to, and the income earned by, private pension
plans, such as occupational pension plans and registered retirement savings plans. For a variety
of reasons many women are unable to contribute to these plans. If they do contribute, they
often receive less of a tax subsidy than men. A primary reason for women’s unequal access to
tax subsidies for occupational pension plans is that access to these plans depends on
participation in the paid labour force in jobs that provide these plans. For example, women
comprise 70 percent of part-time workers, but these plans are not usually available to part-time
workers. Tax breaks for occupational pension plans and RRSPs are also of no value to women
who work only in the home or who have no discretionary funds to contribute to an RRSP.
Given that the role of universal pension schemes such as the Old Age Security appears to be
diminishing and that the government is encouraging more reliance on private pension plans, it
is important that women’s lack of access to tax subsidies for retirement savings be remedied.
One suggestion is to remove all tax preferences from the Income Tax Act and redirect the
funds to the more “universal” plans such as the Old Age Security and the Canada Pension Plan.
Alternatively, the current tax rules could be reformulated in a manner that would improve
women’s accessibility to the subsidies for retirement saving.
Tax subsidies related to dependence, such as the spousal tax credit, need to be rethought.
These measures are a disincentive to women’s participation in the paid labour force and
undermine women’s autonomy. The caregiver tax credit, which is intended to recognize
women’s caregiving in the home, also acts as a disincentive to women’s participation in the
paid labour force and should be restructured to remove this disincentive. The study discusses
whether the tax system is the appropriate tool for delivering subsidies related to dependency
and offers options for reform of the current rules, including, for example, converting the tax
deductions to refundable tax credits.
The study concludes with recommendations intended to assist those who prepare amendments
to the Income Tax Act, including officials at the Department of Finance and the Canada
Customs and Revenue Agency, to evaluate the gender impact of any proposed changes and to
consider, in a more informed manner, the impact of those changes on women. The
recommendations are also intended to provide women’s groups and others interested in the
issue of the impact of the tax system on women with information that might assist them in the
preparation of submissions to the government on tax policy issues. In addition to a call for the
use of statistical data on the socio-economic realties of women’s lives in the setting of tax
policy, the study recommends more consultation between the Department of Finance and
individuals and groups who are able to provide information about women that would be
relevant to the tax policy-making process when changes to the system are being considered.
The study also includes an appendix which lists 10 questions that should be considered
whenever changes to the income tax system are contemplated. The questions allow policy
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makers and others to determine if a particular measure might have a negative impact on
women and if so, how that negative impact might be avoided. The questions focus on issues
related to the impact of a particular measure on women’s participation in the paid labour force,
the impact on women’s autonomy, access to the tax subsidy and other issues intended to allow
policy makers to take the socio-economic realities of women’s lives into account when setting
tax policy.
APPENDIX A:  TAKING ACCOUNT OF WOMEN WHEN SETTING TAX POLICY
In 1992, the Women and Taxation Working Group of the Ontario Fair Tax Commission
(1992: II) recommended that “any proposed changes to tax provisions should be analyzed for
their impact by gender prior to implementation,” and the analysis should be included in the
budget in which the changes are introduced. The following material is intended to assist those
who prepare amendments to the Income Tax Act, including officials at the Department of
Finance and the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, to evaluate the gender impact of any
proposed changes and to consider, in a more informed manner, the impact of those changes
on women. These recommendations are also intended to provide women’s groups and others
interested in the issue of the impact of the tax system on women with information that might
assist them in the preparation of submissions to the government on tax policy issues.
Data
 
 There is clearly a need for the collection and dissemination of more data on the social and
economic realities of women’s lives. For example, while the tax statistics provide a
breakdown of information included on all tax returns by reference to age and gender, they do
not include information on race, sexual orientation and disability. The reason for this
omission is that taxpayers are not required to provide such data on their tax returns. This lack
of data makes it difficult for tax policy makers and others to determine the impact of
proposed tax measures on women. Consideration should be given to ensuring that tax policy
makers have sufficient information about the social and economic status of women in order to
make informed decisions about the impact of proposed policies on women. Data from the
census could be used in this regard.
 
 Consultation
 
 There should be more consultation by the Department of Finance with individuals and groups
who are able to provide information about women that would be relevant to the tax policy-
making process when changes are contemplated to the income tax system. To date, groups
such as the National Association of Women and the Law have been able to make
representations to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance as part of the
budget process, but that is not enough. The Department of Finance should consult with
Status of Women Canada on an ongoing basis about women and tax policy. It should also
invite submissions from interested groups such as the National Action Committee on the
Status of Women, the DisAbled Women’s Network and the National Association of Women
and the Law when changes to the Income Tax Act are proposed. The expertise of these
groups would be of great assistance to the policy makers.
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Specific Questions to Be Considered
In order to take into account the full impact of a tax measure on women, certain questions
should be addressed as part of the tax policy-making process. Some of these questions
include the following.
• Does the proposed tax subsidy favour high-income taxpayers more than low-income
taxpayers because the latter receive less of the subsidy than the former?
 
• Is the tax subsidy available to individuals who pay no tax?
 
• Is a tax subsidy more accessible to those who are employed in the paid labour force on a
full-time basis than to those who work part time or only in the home?
 
• Will interruptions in work in the paid labour force adversely affect entitlement to the tax
subsidy?
 
• Will the proposed tax measure act as a disincentive to women’s participation in the paid
labour force?
 
• Does access to the tax subsidy depend on the private market or the private family playing
a role in its delivery?
 
• Does the tax measure contribute to the undervaluation of women’s labour in the home?
 
• Is the subsidy only available to those in heterosexual relationships?
 
• Where the tax subsidy is in respect to an individual who is economically dependent on
another, is it delivered to the economically dominant person in the relationship?
 
• Does the tax measure undermine the autonomy of women?
If the answer to any of the above questions is yes, could the subsidy be reconfigured
to avoid the negative impact on women or should it be delivered in another manner,
such as by way of a direct grant?
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